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ABSTRACT

Major Lepper examines an apparentirreconcilabilitybetween the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) as reflected in the recent Dutch High Court decision of Short v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands. Staff Sergeant Short, a

member of the United States Air Force, was charged with the murder of
his wife. Under the SOFA, the Netherlands was obligated to surrender
Short to the United States. It refused, basing its actions on its adherence
to the ECHR and its concerns about the possible implementation of the
death penalty in the United States.
The ECHR prohibits the extradition of anyone facing "inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment." Although the original ECHR did
not prohibit capital punishment, a later amendment to the ECHR, the
Sixth Protocol, does prohibit capital punishment. The Dutch High Court
relied heavily on the EuropeanCourt on Human Rights interpretationof
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the ECHR in the Soering case as the basis for its decision.
The Dutch High Court agreed that the NATO SOFA requiredsurrendering SSgt Short to the United States, but determined that the perceived
conflict between the SOFA and the ECHR must be resolved by applying
the ECHR. The author identifiesflaws in the High Court'sfinding that
the ECHR afforded protectionfor SSgt Short, a finding that created the
conflict between the SOFA obligation to surrender the prisoner and the
ECHR mandate to shield him from capitalpunishment. Citing European
Court precedent and the Vienna Convention's conflicting treating rules,
the authorfinds that the SOFA and the ECHR can be read consistently
and suggests that renegotiation of the SOFA is neither necessary nor
inevitable.
The author next evaluates the Dutch position in Short. Because that
position is grounded in the emergingjurisprudenceof human rights, the
author reviews Dutch human rights law and policy and the applicable
portions of the ECHR. The assertion that international human rights
laws supersede other international laws is analyzed in the context of internationallaw's practice of ranking certain norms as 'fundamental."
Finding that capitalpunishment does not violate a peremptory norm, the
author then analyzes the claim that it violates a fundamental right. If
the right not to face capital punishment is indeed fundamental, the issue
becomes whether the NATO SOFA or a customary regional norm
prevails. The author considers arguments supporting each position and
the suggestion that international treaty law justifies a revision of the
NATO SOFA. Major Lepper, however, concludes that similar cases
should be decided on a case-by-case basis so that both countries' policies
can be maintained: strong alliance, military disciplinary control, and
human rights. This case-by-case basis must include a mutual willingness

to reach a compromise such as the one agreed to in Short: the United
States agreed to forego the option of capital punishment in order to retain disciplinary control over its military personnel.
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INTRODUCTION

The Berlin Wall has fallen; the Cold War is over. Not since World
War II has Europe seen as much political and military change as has
occurred during the two past years. Certainly, almost everyone on both
sides of the former "Iron Curtain" will agree that the changes have been
for the better.
Despite the apparent consensus among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations that their alliance must still anticipate and
be ready to parry the military force of the former Soviet Union, also
becoming clear is that significant change is inevitable. Indeed, the United
States has responded to these developments by pledging to reduce the
number of its troops in Western Europe.'

1. See Alan Riding, NATO Struggling to Redefine Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 24,

.
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As the size and structure of NATO's military force changes, the question has arisen whether the conditions of its presence in Western Europe
should also change. In particular, recent events have prompted suggestions that the entire matter of stationing foreign forces in NATO states
be reconsidered. One smaller aspect of that issue is the question whether
the changes in Europe-both recent ones and those that have taken place
gradually over the past forty years-compel re-examination and possible
renegotiation of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The
thesis of the 1991 Brussels Congress of the Society for Military Law and
Law of War (the Society) was that re-examination of the SOFA is certainly in order.2
In its "background paper" designed to stimulate debate among its attendees, the Society recognized an evolving problem: "Sending states...
are increasingly confronted with changed policies of host nations claiming that their national legislation should prevail over the rights and duties laid down in stationing agreements in situations where interests of
the host nation are affected." 3 Because the resulting difficulties are seemingly irreconcilable, it suggests that agreements like the NATO SOFA
be reconsidered. The main purpose of this Article is to consider one aspect of that proposition and its bases. Following the Society's lead, this
Article examines the area of greatest divergence between the United
States and its European allies: human rights. In that context, one recent
case will be of particular interest.

At the end of 1990, the Dutch High Court enjoined its government
from surrendering to the United States a member of the United States
Air Force accused of murdering his wife. Although that may not look
unreasonable at first glance, it actually involved considerable debate and
diplomatic wrangling between the United States and the Netherlands.
The crux of the problem was that the Dutch Court's decision resulted in
the Netherlands violation of the NATO SOFA. According to that treaty,
the United States serviceman, Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Charles Short,
should have been prosecuted by United States military court-martial for
his offense. Because that trial might have led to a death sentence, Dutch
adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
prompted the Court to protect him from that possibility.
Although this case represents only a small part of the question

1990, at A5.
2. Society for Military Law and Law of War General Affairs Commission, Background Paper for the Brussels 1991 Congress (1990) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Society Background Paper].
3. Id. at 1.
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whether the NATO SOFA ought to be reconsidered, it raises numerous
international legal issues, which range from the binding nature of treaties to the status of human rights in international law. This Article examines the United States and Dutch positions in this matter and the
arguments that either have been or could be used to support them. One
goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the continued success of the
NATO SOFA, or its undoing, could lie at the heart of this single case.
This Article begins by examining the Short case in more detail. Then
it will briefly consider the Soering case-the recent decision from the
European Court of Human Rights upon which the Dutch High Court
relied heavily. The next two sections focus on the United States and
Dutch positions respectively. The United States arguments come first because they are based on traditional black-letter notions of international
law. Therefore, they are much easier to understand. The Dutch position,
in contrast, reflects the emergence of human rights as international
norms. As a more contemporary and less well-settled body of jurisprudence, it is understandably controversial. The Article then concludes by
considering whether these two positions can be resolved and, if so, how.
Whether the resolution requires the NATO SOFA's renegotiation is the
ultimate issue the Article will address.
II.

SHORT AND SOERING: THE BACKGROUND TO THE

NATO

SOFA PROBLEM
The United States military tradition of stationing troops on friendly
foreign soil is relatively new, dating primarily to World War I. The
principle of peaceful military occupation, however, can be traced to the
eighteenth-century practice of peaceful transit of armies through the territory of friendly states4 and to the long-accepted naval practice of peaceful passage through their territorial waters and into their ports.5
Since its first foreign ventures, one of the United States primary concerns has been the extent to which members of its armed forces located
abroad may be subject to the receiving state's criminal jurisdiction.' In

4. See

SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTER-

NATIONAL LAW 8 (1971). Since Prussian territories were not contiguous, its forces had
to pass through friendly states in order to move from one garrison to another. Armies
always conducted these forays with the express permission of the sovereign of the state
transited; its scope was generally very narrow, restricting the military force's size, the
duration of its transit, and the conditions under which its transit was authorized. Id.
5. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 673 (4th ed. 1928).
6. See generally id. at 19; G.P. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From
CriminalJurisdiction, 1950 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 186.
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recent years, those concerns typically have been addressed in bilateral or
multilateral status of forces agreements. The first among contemporary
agreements was the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces," or the "NATO
SOFA."'7 Both during and after the United States NATO SOFA ratification process, some lawmakers voiced fears that subjecting GIs to for-

eign criminal prosecution might lead to "cruel and inhuman punishment."" Military authorities expressed concern that without exclusive
jurisdiction over their troops, discipline would be impossible to enforce.,
Although some commentators have argued that the concept of shared jurisdiction incorporated in the NATO SOFA and similar agreements has
rendered these concerns "largely academic,"' the apparent reluctance of
some parties to enforce these treaties recently may have resurrected
them.
Within the past two to three years, increasing European interest in
the international protection of human rights has led to what one recent
article called "an ironic dilemma for an American military justice system
that generally prides itself in its success in securing broad protections for

7. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO
SOFA].

8. See Status of Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty: Supplementary Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Supplementary SOFA Hearings] (statement of Sen. Bricker). In these hearings and others during the Japanese prosecution of Spec. 3 Girard, the Senate was concerned that United States military personnel stationed abroad would not be accorded
rights similar to those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. To be tried without
minimum due process guarantees was unthinkable to the Senate. See also Wilson v.
Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); H.R. RaP. No. 678, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1957) [hereinafter SOFA Revision Hearings]. Generally, status of forces agreements deal with the
problems arising from the stationing of the armed forces of one state in the territory of
another. As an example, the NATO SOFA "defines the status of these forces when they
are sent to another NATO country; it does not of itself create the right to send them in
the absence of a special agreement to that effect." NATO Agreements on Status:
Travaux Preparatoires,1961 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. at 3.

9. See Archibald King, JurisdictionOver FriendlyForeign Armed Forces, 36 AM. J.
INT'L L. 539 (1942). Colonel King argued that "the intervention of the courts of a for-

eign even if friendly country in the discipline of an army would be destructive of that
discipline and inconsistent with the control which any sovereign nation must have of its
own army." Id. at 548.
10. JOSEPH M. SNEE & A. KENNETH PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 9 (1957). In SOFA parlance, a "sending state" is the party

stationing its troops within the borders of the "receiving state."
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the individual rights of its accuseds." ' Specifically, several European
NATO allies have expressed or demonstrated their unwillingness to allow United States military personnel to face capital charges for offenses
arising under the NATO SOFA. These states are also parties to the
ECHR,12' which the European Court of Human Rights recently interpreted to prohibit the extradition of persons accused of capital offenses.1 3
The irony in this, of course, is that this sounds strangely like the United
States long-held view that it must maximize its jurisdiction over its own
military forces abroad in order to avoid exposing them to possible cruel
and unusual punishment.
A.

Short v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands

The facts of a recent case briefly illustrate the tension between human
rights and the NATO SOFA On March 30, 1988, the Dutch Royal
Marechaussee (military police) arrested Staff Sergeant Charles D. Short,
a member of the United States Air Force stationed at Soesterberg Air
Base in the Netherlands, as a suspect in the murder of his wife, a Turkish national.14 At some point during his Dutch interrogation, SSgt Short
admitted killing his wife, dismembering her, and placing her remains in
plastic bags by a dike near Amsterdam. Although the NATO SOFA
clearly vested criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 5 the Dutch authorities refused to turn SSgt Short over to his superiors at Soesterberg
Air Base. Their rationale for not following this treaty, to which both the
United States and the Netherlands are parties, was that to do so would
subject SSgt Short to the risk of capital punishment."6 This, the Dutch
authorities said, would violate their domestic and international commit11. MAJOR JOHN E. PARKERSON, JR. & MAJOR CAROLYN S. STOEHR, The U.S.
Military Death Penalty in Europe: Threatsfrom Recent European Human Rights Developments, 129 MIL. L. REv. 41 (1990).

12. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
13. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50 (1989). Aspects of that
case-the Soering case-will be examined in more detail below. See infra notes 31-42

and accompanying text,
14. Serious Incident Report Message from 32d TFS/JA to HQ USAF/JACI (Mar.
31, 1988). Throughout this Article, messages dispatched by one United States government agency to another will be referred to. This is the routine method by which information is transmitted between military units and State Department entities. The author has
copies on file of all cited messages.
15. See infra notes 100-132 and accompanying text.
16. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [Highest Court], The
Hague, 1990, Nos. 13.949, 13.950, slip op. at 10 (unofficial translation by United States
Department of State).
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ments to abolish the death penalty.1" Although the United States continued to assert that Dutch refusal to release SSgt Short violated its treaty
obligations, those efforts were uniformly unsuccessful.
The manner in which the Dutch handled the case is most interesting.1 8 Shortly after SSgt Short's arrest and confinement by local police,
United States military authorities at Soesterberg Air Base requested his
immediate surrender. The Dutch government held a preliminary hearing
to consider the request. At this and subsequent proceedings, Short's
Dutch defense counsel argued the following: first, that the United States
had waived its primary right to jurisdiction; second, that it had no legal
judicial authority in the Netherlands; and, finally, that Netherlands law
prohibits the surrender of any accused who may face capital
punishment."9
Although the District Court at the Hague acknowledged the United
States primary jurisdiction, it accepted the defense argument that his
surrender would violate Dutch human rights law. Therefore, it ordered
that Short not be surrendered until the government could obtain assurances from the United States that a possible death sentence would not be
carried out. 20 After this initial decision, the United States rejected numerous Dutch diplomatic efforts to obtain either a waiver of its primary
jurisdiction or assurances that Short would not be sentenced to death.
United States military policy prevents waiver of jurisdiction2 1 and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) prohibits giving these

17. An in-depth discussion of the various Dutch judicial decisions that resulted in
this conclusion is beyond the scope of this Article. Essentially, the Dutch criminal courts
ultimately agreed that the United States, indeed, did have primary criminal jurisdiction
over this offense, and therefore, that the Dutch could not prosecute Short. The civil
courts, however, have continued to resist United States efforts to return him to its military control. The primary bases for its decision are the Netherlands adherence to the

European Convention on Human Rights and the recent opinion by the European Court
of Human Rights in Soering. Both of these authorities state unequivocally that parties to
the European Convention may not participate in any decision likely to result in the
application of capital punishment.
18. Unlike the Soering case cited above and described below, this case never reached
the European Commission or Court; it was handled entirely by the Dutch courts. How it
got there and how it was handled should be issues of the greatest United States interest
and concern.
19. See Special Interest Case Update Message from 32d TFS/JA to HQ USAF/

JACI (Apr. 22, 1988).
20. Judgment of May 9, 1988, District Court, The Hague, 1988, Nos. 88/614, 88/
615 (unofficial translation by 32d TFS/JA of an unpublished opinion).
21. See infra notes 196-219 and accompanying text.
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guarantees. 2
While the Dutch Ministry of Justice appealed the district court decision, a Dutch criminal court convicted Short of manslaughter and sentenced him to six years imprisonment. 23 Shortly thereafter, the civil appellate court in the Hague reversed the initial district court decision, but
did not address the criminal conviction. 24 In its decision, the appeals

court again acknowledged that the SOFA allocates primary jurisdiction
to the United States.25 Instead of interpreting Dutch law and the ECHR
as superseding the SOFA, it construed them as consistent; since the
SOFA exempted Short from Dutch criminal jurisdiction, it also removed
him" from its civil and ECHR jurisdiction. Thus, the latter laws and
treaty did not apply.
Obviously, the criminal and civil appeals court decisions conflicted.
Both were appealed. The criminal appeals court reversed the trial court,
holding that since the United States had jurisdiction, Dutch courts lacked
authority to hear the criminal case.26 The Dutch High Court in the

Hague reversed the civil appeals court, ruling that the Netherlands obligations under the ECHR must prevail over conflicting SOFA allocations
of jurisdiction.27 At that point, unless either decision was somehow reversed, the ultimate result would be that SSgt Short-a brutal murderer-would be a free man in the Netherlands. Ultimately, the Dutch
released him to the United States military at the end of 1990. His surrender came after the United States Air Force assured the Dutch government that he would be tried only on noncapital charges. 28 Although the
immediate problem is gone, deep concerns remain about how future
cases will be handled.
The opinion in this tangle deserving the most attention is the Dutch

High Court's decision. The Court divided its meager analysis into three
distinct parts. As a threshold matter, it considered whether the ECHR
even applied to SSgt Short. Because he "reside[d] on the territory of the

22. See Message from HQ USAFE/JA to American Embassy, The Hague (July 12,
1988).
23. See Message from CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR (Oct. 18, 1988).
24. See Message from 32d TFS/JA to HQ USAF/JACI (Nov. 21, 1988).

25. Id.
26. See Memorandum from HQ USAF/JACI to HQ USAF/JAC (Jan. 2, 1990).
27. See Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990 at 10.
28. Letter from Colonel Richard Hagelin, United States Country Representative, to
Mrs. Y.A.T. Kruyer, Public Prosecutor (Oct.'24, 1990). This highly unorthodox guarantee was given only after an investigatory hearing conducted under article 32 of the
UCMJ determined that SSgt Short did not meet the elements of proof required by the
capital statute.
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state"2 and the Dutch government exercised "actual power over and
responsibility" 30 for him, the Court held that it did apply.
This threshold decision joined the conflict between the ECHR and the
NATO SOFA. Recognizing that the SOFA required SSgt Short's surrender and that, after Soering, the ECHR prohibited the extradition of
anyone facing possible capital punishment, the High Court then
searched for a principle in international law that might resolve this impasse. Finding none, it finally resorted to public policy arguments to tip
the scales in the ECHR's favor.
The High Court relied heavily on the Soering case. Although Soering
dealt with matters that arose under an extradition treaty with provisions
significantly different from the SOFA, the High Court considered the
SOFA applicable. The Court also understood that its decision would
force its government to violate the SOFA. This conflict between the
United States and European views of human rights generally, and of
capital punishment in particular, is what has prompted the Society's call
for the SOFA's re-examination. Having seen one result of this conflict,
the Article will now consider how it began.
B.

The Soering Case

In March 1985, Jens Soering, an eighteen year-old West German citizen, was an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia. While
there, he fell in love with Elizabeth Haysom, a fellow student. Their
relationship apparently became quite intense, described by psychiatrists
later as a folie a deux. This is a situation in which one partner is
psychotic and the other "is suggestible to the extent that he or she believes in the psychotic delusions of the other."3 Haysom was severely
mentally disturbed and had a "stupefying and mesmeric effect" on
Soering."2
Apparently, Haysom's parents, who lived nearby in Bedford County,
disapproved of her relationship. Haysom's solution was for her and
Soering to kill them. On March 30, 1985, they rented a car in Charlottesville, Virginia, drove to Washington, D.C. to set up an alibi and
returned to the Haysoms' house. After a discussion during which the
Haysoms repeated their objections to the relationship, an argument ensued. Soering ended it quickly by killing both Mr. and Mrs. Haysom
29.

See Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990 at 7.

30. Id.
31. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (quoting a psychiatric report by a
forensic psychiatrist).
32. Id.
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with a knife. 33
In October 1985, Soering and Elizabeth Haysom fled to the United
Kingdom, where they were apprehended for check fraud in April 1986.
During their detention by British authorities, an investigator from the
Bedford County Sheriff's Department traveled to England and obtained

Soering's confession to the murders. In June 1986, a grand jury of the
Circuit Court of Bedford County indicted Soering for murder. The
United States requested his extradition shortly thereafter. 4
The United Kingdom apparently handled the extradition process quite
routinely, beginning with the issue of a warrant for Soering's arrest and
a request, through diplomatic channels, for assurances from the United
States that he would not be subject to the death penalty if convicted of
murder. The United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty requires
these assurances. Without them, it gives the United Kingdom the discretion not to surrender an accused who might face a death sentence. In due
course, the Attorney for Bedford County-the official responsible for
Soering's ultimate prosecution-agreed. Rather than guaranteeing that
Soering would not face the death penalty, the attorney merely stated that
he would make a representation to the judge at sentencing that "it is the
wish of the United Kingdom that the death penalty should not be imposed or carried out." 35 Although the British government considered that
sufficient, the European Court of Human Rights ultimately disagreed. 6
As the United States extradition process continued, it encountered
some opposition. First, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted its
own extradition request. Although it maintained that it, too, had jurisdiction over the offense and the offender, the British Director of Public
Prosecutions denied the request on the basis that Germany could not
sustain the necessary prima facie case. 3 7 Second, Soering petitioned the
British courts not to extradite him to the United States. Instead, he
wanted to go to West Germany, a state that also had abolished the death
penalty. His request also was denied, and on August 3, 1988, the Secretary of State ordered his surrender to United States authorities.3" Before

the surrender warrant could be executed, Soering petitioned the European Commission of Human Rights. 9 Having satisfied the ECHR's ad-

33.
34.
35.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13.

36. Id.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15.
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missibility rules, Soering's complaint made its way to the European
Court of Human Rights. On July 7, 1989, after a full hearing and in a
lengthy opinion, the Court enjoined the United Kingdom from extraditing him to the United States.
The core of the Court's decision is its analysis of the conditions in the
prison in which Soering would be held in the event he received the death
penalty. It concluded that those conditions would subject him to a phenomenon it called "death row syndrome." It considered Soering's
description of this syndrome as it might apply to him:
[The death row phenomenon consists of] the delays in the appeal and review procedures following a death sentence, during which time he would
be subject to increasing tension and psychological trauma; the fact.., that
the judge or jury in determining sentence is not obliged to take into account the defendant's age and mental state at the time of the offence; the
extreme conditions of his future detention on "death row" in Mecklenburg
Correctional Center, where he expects to be the victim of violence and
sexual abuse because of his age, [race] and nationality; and the constant
spectre of the execution itself, including the ritual of execution.4
Because it recognized that the ECHR itself does not prohibit capital
punishment, the Court limited its inquiry to the question of whether
Soering might be subjected to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" contrary to article 3 of the ECHR.4 ' While the Sixth Protocol
to the ECHR specifically calls for the abolition of the death penalty, it
did not apply to this case because the United Kingdom had not ratified

it."2 After considering all arguments, the Court decided that the ECHR
proscribed the inhuman and degrading death row syndrome.4 The possibility that Soering could be subjected to this treatment in the United
States prevented the United Kingdom from extraditing him there."
Even without the Sixth Protocol, the Court found a way to prevent
Soering's exposure to capital punishment. This Court's convoluted and
sometimes tortured reasoning occasionally lacked objectivity. That, however, supports further the notion that opposition to the death penalty is
more than a legal issue in Europe. It is also a moral issue, and the Sixth
Protocol merely adds legal reinforcement. Judging from the Short case, it
also has become a pillar of Dutch public policy.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
later,

Id. at 41.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Other aspects of the European Court's rationale will be considered in more detail
see infra notes 134-45.
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THE UNITED STATES POSITION: RELIANCE ON "BLACK

LETTER" INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jurisdictional conflicts between sending states and receiving states are
not new phenomena. A similar dispute almost forty years ago led to the
negotiation of the NATO SOFA. With the common experience of World
War II behind them, the NATO nations understood many of the
problems both sending states and receiving states might confront when
military forces are stationed on foreign soil. 45 The NATO SOFA is a
reflection of their common attempt to anticipate and deal with those issues. Primarily because of the spirit of cooperation that has marked
NATO's overall success, that treaty has remained remarkably
46
noncontroversial.
The NATO SOFA is already a treaty of significant compromise. In
Short, the compromise failed. Before considering whether the SOFA's
failure here supports the proposition that it should be renegotiated, understanding the treaty, its history and evolution, and its provisions is important. After that brief review, this section focuses on the SOFA provisions and principles involved both in Short and in two fundamental
United States arguments: first, that the High Court violated the NATO
SOFA; and second, that its violation was not justified under international law. Finally, it considers United States policy in anticipation of
the Dutch argument that the Dutch SOFA violation was based on its
public policy.
A.

A Brief History of the NATO SOFA

Any analysis of criminal jurisdiction over visiting military forces must
begin and end with the principle of territorial sovereignty. In this context, that fundamental principle states that the admission of a force in
peacetime is always subject to the consent of the territorial sovereign and
to the conditions the sovereign imposes.47 One of the first commentators
on this subject, Chief Justice John Marshall, addressed it in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.8 That case involved an attempt by
the United States owners of a ship to recover the ship after it had been
captured by the French and appropriated to use as a warship. In dismissing the suit, Marshall emphasized that "[t]he jurisdiction of [a] na-

45.

See generally G.P. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: QualifiedJurisdictionalImINT'L L. 341.
46. See generally SNEE & PYE, supra note 10 and accompanying text.

munity, 1954 BRIT. Y.B.
47. See
48.

LAZAREFF,

supra note 4, at 8.

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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tion within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." 9 Nevertheless, when
the vessel entered the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, it did
so pursuant to a traditional waiver of that jurisdiction with respect to the
public armed ships of a foreign sovereign. 50
Although his classic formulation of territorial sovereignty established
that it is "exclusive and absolute," Marshall also recognized that it may
be self-limited. He described three situations in which nations traditionally had limited their territorial sovereignty: the immunity afforded foreign sovereigns, diplomatic immunity, and the immunity of foreign
troops in transit with the territorial sovereign's consent."1 While his
opinion is perhaps best known as one of the first authoritative expressions of the absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity, 52 its corollary
principle of absolute immunity of visiting forces is also important. Actually, the latter served as the basis of the rule that guided United States
foreign and military policy for almost 150 years thereafter: United States
forces abroad were subject only to "the law of the flag."5 3
1. The "Law of the Flag"
For quite some time after The Schooner Exchange, many scholars and
international lawyers held the view that a military force "operating on
foreign soil is in no way subject to the territorial sovereign and exercises
an exclusive right of jurisdiction over its members."'" License to enter or

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 137-40.
See GARY B. BORN &

UNITED STATES COURTS

DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN

336 (1989).

53. See, e.g., LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 13.
54. See id. at 12 (quoting Aline Chalufour, Le statut juridique des Forces allies
pendant la guerre 1914-1918 (1927) (unpublished thesis, Paris)). In contrast, some commentators dispute whether international law ever recognized a state's exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over its forces abroad. In the extensive hearings leading to the United States
Senate's ratification of the NATO SOFA, some lawmakers argued that its formula for
shared sending-state and receiving-state jurisdiction reflected a departure from customary
international law. See, e.g., Supplementary SOFA Hearings,supra note 8, at 56 (statement of Senator Bricker). They suggested that the United States would have more jurisdiction over its troops on foreign soil without a treaty because customary international
law would then vest exclusive jurisdiction in their commanders. The United States Attorney General disagreed. In an often cited opinion to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Attorney General argued that customary international law never conferred
exclusive jurisdiction to the sending state. Construing Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
extremely narrowly, he stated that "The Schooner Exchange, . . .which is the chief
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to cross a foreign nation necessarily carried with it an express or implied
right to maintain military discipline free from the territorial sovereign's
interference. 5 This, in turn, was translated into two separate but
equally important concepts: absolute immunity of individual military
members from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state 58 and the
immunity of the sending state's57disciplinary processes from the receiving
state's supervisory jurisdiction.
One of Chief Justice Marshall's fundamental assumptions in The
Schooner Exchange was that the need to maintain discipline forms a
cornerstone of military doctrine.5" Without the authority or ability to
impose punishment within a unit, the commander would soon lose control; the "forces would cease to be an army and would become a mob." 59
Indeed, universal recognition of this has been one of the few constants
throughout this debate and perhaps is the central theme of the "law of
the flag" theory.
Exclusive sending-state jurisdiction over one's military forces evolved
before and after The Schooner Exchange as a result of international
practice. Since most of it was based on the brief transit of those forces
through foreign territory, this concession from the receiving sovereign almost always was only implied.60 As the practice evolved to permanently
stationing forces abroad, agreements and their jurisdictional arrangements became more formal.61 The earliest of these agreements arose during wars. In World War I, "[a] series of agreements concluded by
France ...granted exclusive jurisdiction to the military tribunals of the
armed forces of the Allied Powers in France over the members of those
forces."1 2 After the war, the United Kingdom continued to exercise ex-

reliance of those who contend that the visiting forces are entitled to absolute immunity,
stands for no such proposition." Supplementary SOFA Hearings, supra note 8, at 38
(Department of Justice Memorandum of Law); see also SOFA Revision Hearings,
supra note 8, at 9. While the Attorney General may have been correct-Marshall's
opinion may have been read too broadly-the practice of the United States and other
nations and the writings of scholars accepting absolute immunity as a principle of international law sufficiently proves that it did exist. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900).
55. See, e.g., King, supra note 9, at 562.
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
58. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 140.

59. King, supra note 9, at 548.
60. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 139.
61. See generally Edward D. Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 349, 383-90 (1955).
62. Supplementary SOFA Hearings, supra note 8, at 41 (Department of Justice
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clusive criminal jurisdiction over its forces in Egypt6" and, together with

the United States, negotiated immunity from receiving-state jurisdiction
during World War 1I.6' In recognition of this widespread practice, some
scholars continued to regard exclusive jurisdiction as a necessary characteristic of stationing forces abroad."5
As the absolute theory of sovereign immunity began to give way to the
restrictive theory, the scope of "the law of the flag" also began to narrow. Courts and writers began limiting its formerly infinite breadth,

whittling away at its edges. 6 Despite these attempts to interpret more
narrowly the exclusivity of sending-state jurisdiction, the United States
continued to apply the broader "law of the flag" concept in its foreign
affairs. Thus, as mentioned above, in World Wars I and II the United
States insisted upon, and generally received, the right to discipline its
troops exclusive of receiving-state criminal jurisdiction and free from its

Memorandum of Law). In his argument that international law never supported the "law
of the flag" theory, the Attorney General distinguished these agreements by suggesting
that they recognized the status of British and United States forces as occupation powers
in complete control over the territory they occupied. That should be distinguished from
the status of a force as an invited guest during peacetime. In the latter situation, he
argued, international law does not accord the sending state the same prerogatives. Id. at
41-49.
63. See LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 23.
64. See, e.g., Supplementary SOFA Hearings, supra note 8, at 42 (Department of
Justice Memorandum of Law). In his submission to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee, the Attorney General conceded that during World War II, the United States was
not the only Allied power to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over its forces abroad. While
the United States insisted on these rights in the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom
itself obtained the same rights in Belgium, China, Ethiopia, and Portugal.
65. See, e.g., King, supra note 9.
66. Thus, Oppenheim acknowledged in his international law treaties:
Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the service of their home state,
they are considered exterritorial and remain, therefore, under its jurisdiction. A
crime committed on foreign territory by a member of these forces cannot be punished by the local civil or military authorities, but only by the commanding officer
of the forces or by other authorities of their home state.
To this restatement of the theory of exclusive jurisdiction, he added an important
qualification:
This rule, however, applies only in case the crime is committed, either within the
place where the force is stationed, or in some place where the criminal was on
duty; it does not apply, if, for example, soldiers belonging to a foreign garrison of
a fortress leave the rayon of the fortress, not on duty but for recreation and pleasure, and then and there commit a crime. The local authorities are in that case
competent to punish them.
1 0PPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 670; see also 1 CHARLES C. HYDE, International Law
432-34 (1922).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24.867

interference.8 7 While some saw this insistence as a departure from generally-accepted concepts of international law,"' others considered it consis69
tent with the still-viable "law of the flag."
Faced with the need to maintain an effective security apparatus in
Europe following World War II, the NATO states 70 recognized the need
for a treaty that established the rights and obligations of visiting forces.
To that end, the Brussels Treaty powers-Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-signed the Status of
Members of the Armed Forces of the Brussels Treaty Powers agreement
in 1949.71 To many, this treaty signalled an end to the concept of exclusive sending-state jurisdiction.7 2 Although it recognized continued sending-state jurisdiction over members of the sending state's military force,
it also subjected those members to prosecution in the courts of the receiving state.73 While this particular treaty never entered into force, it "al-

67. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
68. See Barton, supra note 6, at 198-201.
69. See, e.g., Re Exemption of U.S. Forces From Canadian Criminal Law, 1943
S.C.R. 483, 501-02 (Can.) (Kerwin, J., concurring).
70. The original NATO SOFA signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. NATO SOFA, supra note 7, at 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. at

67,
71. Supplementary SOFA Hearings, supra note 8, at 45 (Department of Justice
Memorandum of Law).
72. Barton states:
In contributions which have been made in recent years to the subject of the liability of members of a visiting force to criminal proceedings in a local court for an
offence against the local law, writers have assured their readers that almost, all of
the Western European states are firmly committed to the view that under international law there is no such liability. To support this contention reference is made
to the jurisdictional agreements concluded by the Governments of Belgium and
France during the First World War, to the writings of British, French, and
Netherlands international lawyers, and, for confirmation of British state practice,
to a statement of the Attorney-General in the House of Commons.... According
to such a view it would be a foregone conclusion that any arrangement between
Western European states for the visit and sojourn of their armed forces abroad in
one another's territory would make provision for the absolute immunity of members of those forces from criminal jurisdiction in the local courts.
Contrary to this supposition, the multilateral Agreement concluded in the form
of a treaty between ... Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom . . . provided that members of a visiting force would, without
exception, be subject to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the local courts.
Barton, supra note 6, at 205-06.
73. See Supplementary SOFA Hearings,supra note 8, at 45 (Department of Justice
Memorandum of Law). Article 7(2) of that agreement provided:
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. members to define a common attitude on the subject, an

attitude which allowed them to go to the London negotiations on the
Status of the NATO Forces with a common approach."'' 7 Of course, that
approach advocated shared jurisdiction.
Although the United States delegation to the NATO SOFA negotiations continued to adhere to the "law of the flag" theory in principle,7 5
its initial draft conceded an allocation of jurisdiction not significantly different from that of the Brussels Treaty.76 Thus, this draft and the ultimate agreement established a formula for sharing criminal jurisdiction
over the members of visiting forces between the sending and receiving
states.

Members of a "foreign force" who commit an offense in the "receiving state"
against the laws in force in that state can be prosecuted in the courts of the "receiving state."
When the act is also an offense against the law of the "sending state," the
authorities of the "receiving state" will examine with the greatest sympathy any
request, received before the court has declared its verdict, for the transfer of the
accused for trial before the courts of the "sending state."
Where a "member of a foreign force" commits an offense against the security of,
or involving disloyalty to, the "sending state" or an offense against its property, or
an offense against a member of the force to which he belongs, the authorities of the
"receiving state" where the offense was committed will prosecute only if they consider that special considerations require them to do so.
The competent military authorities of the "foreign force" shall have, within the
"receiving state," any jurisdiction conferred upon them by the law of the "sending
state" in relation to an offense committed by a member of their own armed forces.
Id.
74. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 45.
75. See Summary Record of a Meeting of the Working Group on Status, MSR(51) 4 (Jan. 31, 1951), reprinted in NATO Travaux Preparatoires,supra note
8, at 64.
Commenting on Article VI of the draft prepared by his Delegation, the United
States Representative drew the attention of the Working Group to the following
points. Article VI [dealing with jurisdiction over the visiting forces] was based on
the principle that the jurisdiction of the receiving State applied to "foreign forces
and civilian personnel," ... . This principle, on which the United States draft was
based, differed from international law, which provided that-in the absence of any
special agreement-the sending state retained the right of jurisdiction over its
forces stationed outside the national territory. The international law on the subject
was largely inspired by the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon ....
Id.
76. See Status of Forces Agreement-Draft Submitted by the United States Deputy,
D-D(51) 23 (Jan. 23, 1951), reprinted in NATO Travaux Preparatoires,supra note 8,
at 345.
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2. Exclusive Receiving-State Jurisdiction
The United States ratification of the NATO SOFA marked the end of
its adherence to the notion of exclusive sending-state jurisdiction." As a
result, the United States apparently no longer seriously considers the
"law of the flag" theory to be a viable principle of international law.
During the ratification process, United States legislators understood
that the SOFA would replace exclusive jurisdiction in the NATO states.
Many contended, however, that the "law of the flag" would continue
when no status of forces treaty existed.7 The United States Attorney
General disagreed. In his often-cited and comprehensive memorandum to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Attorney General examined customary international law and concluded that in the absence of
a SOFA, United States military forces would be subject to the receivingstate's exclusive criminal jurisdiction.7 9 Although his was just another
opinion among many on both sides of this debate, it was particularly
persuasive. Ultimately, it not only secured the NATO SOFA's ratification, it also helped prevent later Senate efforts to withdraw from it.80
The principle of territorial sovereignty formed the basis for the Attorney General's view that the sending state would possess no jurisdiction
over its troops in the absence of a contrary agreement. He said, "[a]ll
exemptions from territorial jurisdiction must be derived from the consent
of the sovereign of the territory.""1 In a contemporary world that views

states as equals and regards their sovereignty highly, this view carries
great weight. Although the NATO SOFA and similar treaties have
made this a moot issue, without them, this is the view that would probably prevail today.82

77. See generally Barton, supra note 45, at 364-65.
78. See e.g., Supplementary SOFA Hearings, supra note 8, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Bricker).
79. Id. at 38 (Department of Justice Memorandum).
80. See SOFA Revision Hearings, supra note 8, at 20 (Department of State
memorandum).
81. Supplementary SOFA Hearings,supra note 8, at 50 (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812)).
82. Interestingly, despite this contemporary view that sending-state jurisdiction is an
exception to the rule of territorial sovereignty, an amicus curiae brief filed by a Dutch
attorney to the Short appeals court argued that the "law of the flag" theory still prevails.
See Amicus Brief for the United States, Short v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Gerechtshof (Aug. 29, 1988). This attorney was retained by the United States to present the
Dutch law that supported United States jurisdiction. Apparently, his surprising reliance
on exclusive sending-state jurisdiction as the rule modified by the SOFA was a reasonable Dutch interpretation of international law. The court of appeals agreed with the argu-
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The Netherlands Violated the NATO SOFA's Text: Some
JurisdictionalArguments

The NATO SOFA represents the most recent innovation in the progress of extraterritorial military criminal jurisdiction. As a treaty of significant compromise, until recently it also has occupied successfully the
middle ground between the prior "law of the flag" and exclusive receiving-state theories of jurisdiction. Cases like Short, however, suggest that
this evolution is incomplete.
As Short demonstrated, United States and European views of capital
punishment differ, a divergence that affects the NATO SOFA and vice
versa. Following is a discussion of the language and concepts at the core
of the NATO SOFA compromise, their jurisdictional framework, and
how each conflicts with the Dutch High Court's Short decision. Together, they form the basis of the United States argument that the High
Court violated this treaty-a treaty that for forty years has been blackletter international law.
1. Judicial Jurisdiction Under the NATO SOFA
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States recognizes that international law limits states' exercise of three
types of jurisdiction: prescriptive, enforcement, and adjudicative.8 3 Adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction, the focus here, is the state's authority to
'
"subject persons or things to the process of its courts." 84
Traditionally,
one of those limits held that a state could not exercise its jurisdiction
beyond its borders. Today, however, this tradition has many exceptions.
In the context of extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, judicial juris-

ment, and the High Court did not expressly reject it. See Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990,
Hage Raad der Nederlanden [Highest Cort], The Hague, 1990, Nos. 14,449, 13,950 slip
op. The Dutch representative to the NATO SOFA negotiations argued against the Italian view that sending-state jurisdiction ought to be characterized as an exception to the
receiving state's right of jurisdiction. The Dutch representative "regarded the rule of the
right of jurisdiction of the receiving-state to be an exception to the principle of the right
of jurisdiction of the sending-state; military acts fell normally within the competence of
the military authorities. In his opinion, this was the rule adopted by international law."
Summary Record of a Meeting of the Working Group on Status (Juridical Subcommittee), MS(J)-R(51) 2 (Feb. 8, 1951), reprintedin NATO Travaux Preparatoires,supra
note 8, at 94. Thus, while the United States has conceded that it may no longer exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over its troops abroad, apparently the states in which they are stationed do not agree uniformly.
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
84. Id. § 401(b).
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diction assumes two different forms. The first, and most common, focuses
on a court's power to decide issues concerning matters or parties outside
its territorial reach. As a rule, state courts may adjudicate only those
offenses committed within the state.85 As a corollary, that reach extends
only to violations of that state's criminal law; international consensus is
-that states do not enforce the penal laws of other states. 6 More important for this discussion, however, is a second form of judicial authority:
the ability of a state's courts to conduct trials within another state. Although the United States and other nations have exercised throughout
history this aspect of judicial authority extraterritorially, the world community today widely accepts that the sovereignty of other states prohibits
that practice.8 7 The only recognized exception is the military court-martial conducted pursuant to a status of forces treaty. 8
The NATO SOFA establishes its concept of shared jurisdiction over
visiting forces in the first paragraph of article VII:
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to
exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons
subject to the military law of that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the
members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State and
punishable by the law of that State. 9
This clearly recognizes the rights of both sending and receiving states to
punish military members for violations of their respective criminal laws.
More important, however, is that paragraph 1(a) grants the sending
state the right to exercise that authority within the borders of the receiving state. This has been interpreted, during the negotiations90 and

85. See S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 9, at 20 (Sept. 7)
(acknowledging that while the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, many
states have exceptions that extend the reach of their criminal laws).
86. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 422(1).
87. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
88. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 422 Reporter's Note 5.
89. NATO SOFA, supra note 7, art. VII, para. 1, at 1798, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76.
90. See Summary Record of a Meeting of the Working Group on Status (Juridical
Subcommittee), MS(J)-R(51) 4 (Feb. 16, 1951), reprinted in NATO Travaux
Preparatoires,supra note 8, at 99-100. The parties appeared to take for granted that
sending-state military authorities could, under the Agreement, conduct courts-martial
within the borders of the receiving state. Removing all doubt, this subcommittee extended
the definition of "military authorities" to include civilian judicial authorities "who might
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through subsequent practice, to allow sending states to convene courtsmartial within the receiving state. Those who advocated continuing
United States exclusive jurisdiction over its military abroad probably did
not regard this express grant of sending-state judicial jurisdiction as significant because it did not change United States practice up to that point.
In this respect, article VII arguably merely codified customary international law. Nonetheless, those who recognized that the exercise of judicial jurisdiction within the borders of another state is a substantial intrusion into its territorial sovereignty must have appreciated its importance.
In the first of his three articles during this period on the status of
visiting forces, Dr. G.P. Barton, a British international law scholar, discussed this customary practice as it existed prior to the SOFA. 9 ' To enforce military law, visiting forces traditionally carried their courts with
them. At the same time, many Western nations also operated what were
known as "consular courts." In "non-Christian states," these courts often
exercised "complete civil and criminal jurisdiction . . .over the privileges, life, and property of their countrymen."9 2 Needless to say, the latter courts were extremely unpopular among receiving states and were
considered, even at that time, contrary to the principles of international
law.9 3 As a result, they were eventually eliminated. 94 In contrast, courtsmartial survived, apparently resting on firmer foundations. 95

be brought within the territory of the receiving-state for the application of the present
Agreement." Id. at 100.

91. See G.P. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Supervisory Jurisdiction, 1949 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 380.
92. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 668.
93. See id.

94. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957).
95. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 669-70. Thus, Barton concluded that customary international law supported this extraterritorial exercise of sending-state judicial
authority:
The consent of a state to the presence in its territory of the armed forces of a
friendly foreign State implies an obligation to allow the service courts and authorities of that visiting force to exercise such jurisdiction in matters of discipline and
internal administration over members of that force as are derived from their own
law.
Barton, supra note 91, at 412. Nevertheless, he also admitted that it was, indeed, a
significant intrusion into the sovereignty of the receiving-state: "The right of service
courts and authorities of a foreign state to exercise their jurisdiction in the territory of the
local state comprises a significant exception to the sovereignty of the latter state over its
territory." Id. at 412-13. The fact that courts-martial flourished supports the idea that
article VII's establishment of sending-state judicial jurisdiction is merely a codification of
customary international law. This conclusion is supported by the writings of other international law scholars of Barton's and earlier eras. See, e.g., 1 HYDE, supra note 66, at
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Although the proposition that the United States, or any other sending
state, may convene military courts-martial in the territory of consenting
receiving states is now well-settled, that authority clearly has limits. The
portion of article VII quoted above suggests that one limit is the receiving state's concurrent judicial jurisdiction. Not only does that provision
allow the sending state to try its military members within the receiving
state, but it also vests the same authority in the latter's courts. The conflict inherent in this overlapping jurisdiction is resolved by the rest of
article VII, which further allocates to each court the types of offenses it
can adjudicate. This is the concept of shared criminal jurisdiction, which
is examined below.
That sending-state courts-martial operate on foreign soil only because
its forces are permitted to be there raises the additional question whether
their jurisdiction also may be limited by the receiving state or its courts.
This is an important issue raised in the Short case.
Barton concludes that a receiving state's courts have no supervisory
jurisdiction over sending-state military courts. Supervisory jurisdiction is
one court's power to limit another's exercise of authority."6 Within a
single state, superior courts routinely assert that power over inferior
courts.97 In the international context, however, Barton suggests that this

relationship between courts of different states would violate the sovereignty of the state whose courts' authority was limited. 8 As between
them, he concludes that receiving-state consent to allow visiting force
432; OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 669. Thus, the operation of United States military
courts-martial in the Netherlands is based on customary international law and the

NATO SOFA. Both, in turn, depend on Dutch consent to the presence of United States
forces. In this case, the extraterritorial exercise of United States military judicial jurisdiction rests on solid international legal foundations.
96. Barton, supra note 91, at 381. He defines that jurisdiction by example:
[I]f the Swiss [sending-state] courts-martial were recognized as inferior judicial
tribunals by English [receiving-state] law, and if Y [a member of the Swiss visiting
forces] could show some excess of jurisdiction or other irregularity in the proceedings of the court-martial trying him, it would appear that the writs of prohibition
or certiorariwould be available as an effective means of preventing the apprehended wrong. By exercising jurisdiction in these ways the English courts would
be supervising the exercise of the powers given to the service courts and authorities
of the visiting force in matters of discipline and internal administration by the law
of the state to which they belong.

Id.
97. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Vines, The Role of Courts of Appeals in the FederalJudidal Process, in COURTS, JUDGES, AND PoLrrics 90 (Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman
Pritchett eds., 3d ed. 1979).
98. See generally Barton, supra note 91, at 412.
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courts-martial "effectively implies an obligation to secure the immunity
of the visiting forces from the supervisory jurisdiction of the local

courts." 9 Logically, visiting forces' courts-martial should operate independently. Any other conclusion would allow receiving-state courts to
protect foreign military personnel from prosecution, violate the sendingstate's sovereignty, and undermine the SOFA's allocation of criminal
jurisdiction.
The applicability of this principle to Short is obvious. By basing its
refusal to surrender SSgt Short on the possibility that he may face the
death penalty, the High Court limited the exercise of a court-martial's
authority in exactly the manner Barton and reasonableness condemn; the
Court anticipated a military court's judgment and substituted its own.
2.

Criminal Jurisdiction Under the NATO SOFA

Because concurrent judicial jurisdiction does not mean that a receiving-state court has supervisory jurisdiction over a sending-state court, it
necessarily. does mean that each body has its own sphere of authority.
That notion is the basis for the SOFA's second area of shared jurisdiction: criminal jurisdiction. In SOFA parlance, the term criminal jurisdiction encompasses the other forms of jurisdiction recognized by the Restatement-enforcement and prescriptive-as well as the other aspect of
judicial jurisdiction: the power to adjudicate violations of criminal law.100
Article VII defines two types of criminal jurisdiction. First, receivingstates and sending-states enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over acts violating
the criminal laws of one state, but not the other.'0 1 Second, when a military member violates the laws of both states, the criminal jurisdiction of
each is concurrent and the SOFA further identifies which state has the

primary right to prosecute."0 2 By defining the boundaries between the
receiving-state and sending-state courts in terms of exclusive and primary concurrent jurisdiction, the SOFA reinforces the principle that
neither has authority over the other. Only one court has the independent
power to prosecute any one case at any time.
The NATO SOFA still recognizes the concept of exclusive jurisdiction. While it is not applied nearly as broadly as the United States exercised it before and during World War II, the SOFA nevertheless acknowledges that sending states and receiving states each have special

99. Id.
100. See

RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 401.
101. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
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interests codified in their criminal laws."0 3 Article VII, paragraph 2, establishes the right of each to pursue its interests:
2. (a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of
that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the
receiving State.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and
their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the
security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the- law of the
sending State."'
Thus, when an act violates the law of one state, but not the other, the
offended state has the exclusive right to prosecute and punish the
offender.
One question that arose during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's NATO SOFA hearings was whether any receiving state's laws
were considerably different from the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ).1 05 The committee's obvious concerns were that not only would
these laws be unfamiliar to the average United States military personnel,
they would form the basis for extensive receiving-state exclusive jurisdiction. The State Department Legal Adviser's replied that because the
UCMJ has a "clause which really incorporates into our military code all
crimes of the locality in which the troops are operating,"1 06 a particular
act most likely will not violate only receiving-state law. Although military courts have since determined that not every violation of local law is
also an offense under the UCMJ, almost forty years of experience have
demonstrated that the scope of exclusive receiving-state jurisdiction is
1 7
quite narrow. 1

Despite some concern prior to its ratification, the NATO SOFA has
not significantly undermined discipline within United States visiting
forces. 10 s Since most purely military offenses have no counterparts in
103. For a discussion of the notion that agreements such as the SOFA allocate jurisdiction as a function of prevailing-state interests, see Barton, supra note 45, at 362.
104. NATO SOFA, supra note 7, art. VII, para. 2, at 1798, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76.

105. See Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1953) [hereinafter NATO SOFA Hearings].
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., SNEE & PYE, supra note 10, at 32-33.
108. See SOFA Revision Hearings,supra note 8, at 15 (statement of General Lauris
Norstad, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe).
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receiving-state criminal laws, the sending state retains exclusive jurisdiction over them. 10 9 This, combined with the sending state's retention of a
sort of residual jurisdiction to prosecute violations of military discipline
arising out of concurrent jurisdiction offenses,110 means that commanders
still exercise considerable punitive authority.
In the Short context, the allocation of exclusive criminal jurisdiction is
of little direct importance. SSgt Short's crime of murder is clearly a violation of the criminal laws of both the sending state and receiving state.
When an act violates the laws of both the sending and receiving states,
it is subject to neither's exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, a SOFA formula
seeks to balance the interests of each state in the offense and the offender. Recalling the discussion of supervisory jurisdiction, this formula
recognizes that although both states have jurisdiction to prosecute the
offense, only one may do so practically. Article VII, paragraph 3 states:
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force ... in relation to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the
force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance
of official duty.
(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State
shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.""
This provision gives the receiving state the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in all but two situations. First, the sending state has the primary right when the offense is directed against sending-state property or
security or when its victim is another member of the visiting force or
persons accompanying it. These are called inter se offenses." 2 The second category consists of offenses committed in the performance of official
military duties.
109. Most nonmilitary criminal codes do not address offenses like AWOL, desertion,
or conduct unbecoming an officer, which are examples of offenses that would fall to the
sending state's exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute.
110. NATO SOFA, supra note 7, art. VII, para 8, at 1802, 199 U.N.T.S. at 80.
This provision allows the sending state to prosecute a member of its force "for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence for
which he was tried by the authorities of another Contracting Party." Id.
111. Id. Art. VII, para. 3, at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 77-78.
58

112. See Roland Stanger, CriminalJurisdictionover Visiting Armed Forces, 1957NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 185 (1957).
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This was the area of greatest compromise for the United States. Until
the SOFA entered into force, its troops were prosecuted under the

UCMJ for almost all offenses."' Faced with the certainty of losing this
privileged status, this formula emerged from the negotiations as the one
most capable of protecting the interests of all parties.114 Since each
NATO nation would likely be both a sending and receiving-state, the
SOFA had to address concerns in both areas. The primary sending-state
concerns were to maintain military discipline and, therefore, to maximize
jurisdiction over their own forces. As receiving states, their efforts to take
away the special privileges that traditionally cloaked visiting forces pulled in exactly the opposite direction. Article VII's formula represents a
middle ground that generally preserves the military's ability to prosecute
offenses most likely to prejudice good order and discipline, while it gives
the receiving state authority over offenses affecting its public order.115
The official duty exception reflects traditional military concern that its
official operations must not be subject to the influence of forces outside
the chain of command. The exception elicited considerable debate during
the SOFA negotiations, primarily because it was perceived as having the
capacity to transform shared jurisdiction back into exclusive sendingstate jurisdiction. 6 Although most attempts to limit the definition of
"official duty" were not incorporated into the treaty itself, subsequent
practice has proven this exception to be fairly narrow.1 17 In practice, the
determination by sending-state officials that an offense arose out of official duty creates a rebuttable presumption to that effect. 1 ' This exception to the receiving state's general primary right of jurisdiction has
caused few problems during the SOFA's history. Some of those
problems, however, such as in Wilson v. Girard, created substantial
controversy.' 1 9
The inter se exception recognizes the sending state's greater interest in
prosecuting offenses committed entirely within its own military commu-

nity.12 This concept seems to have evolved from the customary right of
military forces to exercise exclusive jurisdiction on its ships and within

113. See generally NATO SOFA Hearings, supra note 105, at 26.
114. See, e.g., id. at 5.
115. See, e.g., id.
116. See Stanger, supra note 112, at 222.
117. See SNEE & PYE, supra note 10, at 47.
118. See id. at 51-52.
119. See id. at 49-50. Professors Snee and Pye describe the Girard case as underlining the divergence of views on what constitutes "an offense arising out of an act or
omission done in the performance of official duty." Id. at 49.
120. See, Stanger, supra note 112, at 185-89.
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its military installations. 21 Although the SOFA's formula eliminates the
distinction between crimes committed within or outside bases, it still defers to the sending state when the offender is a member of its military
and the victim is military, a member of its civilian component, or a
dependent.
In addition to the textual commitment of certain cases to the primary
jurisdiction of either the sending or receiving state, the SOFA contains a
clause that allows both parties to change this formula on an ad hoc basis.
Recognizing that applying the SOFA formula mechanically may not account accurately for the interests of parties in particular cases, the negotiators included article VII, paragraph 3(c):
If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The
authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic
consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a
waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to
be of particular importance.122
This allows either state to waive its primary right if it considers the
other state's prosecution motives to be more important. 12 3 The United
States military's experience in Europe suggests that many receiving
states will waive their primary right unless they have particular, important reasons for asserting them. 2 4 The United States, in contrast, rarely
waives its primary right. 2 5 This may be due in part to the narrow limit
of its primary right to cases in which it always has important prosecution interests.'

26

In many NATO states in which United States forces are stationed,
this formula has been modified. For example, the Netherlands and the
United States agreed to the following expression of intent regarding the
waiver of primary concurrent jurisdiction:
The Netherlands authorities, recognizing that it is the primary responsi121. See id. at 186.
122. NATO SOFA, supra note 7, art. VII, para. 3(c), at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 78.
123. See Stanger, supra note 112, at 240-43.
124. See Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 11, at 50. For example, 1988 Department
of Defense statistics show that the Netherlands waived 97.8% of its primary concurrent
jurisdiction cases involving United States military personnel. Id.
125. See id. at 48.
126. Another reason why the United States almost never waives its primary right is
because the "sense of the Senate," as part of its resolution giving advice and consent to
the NATO SOFA treaty, is interpreted by United States military authorities as a requirement to maximize United States jurisdiction. See id.
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bility of the United States authorities to maintain good order and discipline where persons subject to United States military law are concerned,
will, upon the request of the United States authorities, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article VII, except where they
determine that it is of particular12 importance that jurisdiction be exercised
by the Netherlands authorities.
If the basic article VII formula allocates general primary concurrent jurisdiction to the receiving state, this "Netherlands Formula" shifts it de
facto to the United States."2 Although practice supports this observation,

it is only because the spirit of cooperation between these two states has
been particularly strong. This blanket waiver is clearly meaningless if
the Netherlands expands its view of the cases it considers "of particular
importance."
3.

Summary of the NATO SOFA Jurisdictional Arguments

Article VII's concurrent jurisdiction formula assigns the primary right
to prosecute to the state with the presumed greater interests in doing so.
If those interests weigh more heavily in favor of the other state in a
particular case, the waiver provision allows the primary right to be
reassigned.
Short arose under article VII's inter se exception. Thus, its mechanical application vests the primary right to prosecute SSgt Short in the
United States. The United States is presumed to have greater interests in
cases of this type. 29 Should that presumption have prevailed against the
Netherlands concerns about capital punishment? Clearly, the SOFA text
gives the United States the right to make that decision. First, as matters
of both law and practice, the interests of the state without the primary
right to prosecute are considered only in the context of article VII's
waiver provision. In this particular case, the Dutch government twice
requested a waiver of the primary right from the United States. Both
were refused. The United States considered its interest paramount and,
under the rules of the SOFA, maintained its presumption. The goals of
uniform and predictable justice are important ones, especially for a state
whose forces in the absence of a SOFA would be subject to many diverse
foreign legal systems. These goals are advanced only if the SOFA is

127. Agreement With Annex Between the United States of America and the Netherlands Regarding Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, Aug. 13,
1954, U.S.-Neth., annex, para. 3, 6 U.S.T. 103, 106 [hereinafter Netherlands
Supplement].
128. See Stanger, supra note 112, at 243-44.
129. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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enforced.
A second reason why Dutch concerns about capital punishment should
not automatically take precedence is rooted in article VII's basic concept
of shared jurisdiction. As discused above, one of article VII's most important concessions is its recognition of the sending state's "right to exercise within the receiving [sitate all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
• . .over all persons subject to the military law of that [sjtate."'' 30 Again,
this means that military courts should be able to operate within the receiving state free of its supervisory jurisdiction. If that were not the case,
jurisdiction would not truly be shared; the sending state's exercise of jurisdiction would be subject to the receiving state's indirect control. Certainly, one of the factors the receiving state may consider when deciding
whether to waive its primary right is the sentence an offender might
receive in the sending state's court.1 ' The receiving state must recognize
that once it has waived that right, its lack of supervisory authority over
that court places any trial outcome-including sentence-beyond its control.i" 2 When article VII gives the primary right to the sending state in
the first instance, the receiving state has nothing to waive, and the result
is the same. Since article VII vests the primary right over SSgt Short's
offense in the United States, its implied assurance that this jurisdiction

may be exercised without Dutch interference makes sentence irrelevant.
C.

The NATO SOFA After Soering

The High Court's opinion and the Dutch Advocaat-Generaal's particularly well-reasoned and persuasive brief' 3 conceded many of the argu130.

NATO SOFA, supra note 7, art. VII, para. 1(a), at 1798, 199 U.N.T.S. at 76.

131.

Contra Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 11, at 52. These authors argue that, at

least under the German SOFA supplement, "officials in the host nation who are responsible for the administration of justice may not when making waiver decisions be guided
by whether a[n United States] military court might impose the death sentence in particular cases." This position is unreasonable. Waiver has long been understood as an exercise
of discretion. Although the SOFA itself commits certain offenses to the exclusive or primary concurrent jurisdiction of the sending or receiving state, it places no binding constraints on the exercise of waiver.
132. See Whitley v. Aitchison, 26 I.L.R. 196 (Fr. Ct. of Cassation 1958), reprinted
in NoYEs E. LEECH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM 469, 472 (1973).
There, the court stated that when:
the authorities of the State which has the right of primary jurisdiction have, at the
request of the other State, waived that right, their decision is final, and the criminal courts of the State concerned can no longer exercise jurisdiction over facts in
respect of which there has been a waiver.
133. See Opinion of Advocaat-Generaal Strikwerda, Short v. The Kingdom of the
Netherlands, 29 I.L.M. 1375, 1378 (1990) [hereinafter Advocaat-Generaal's Brief].
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ments above. Nevertheless, the Court declined to follow them. Section IV
will consider the Society's suggestion that public policy and the fundamental status Dutch law accords the ECHR might have greatly affected
its decision. Indeed, the Advocaat-Generaal's recommendation that SSgt
Short not be surrendered was based almost squarely upon those grounds.
As the role of human rights in European law has grown stronger,
perhaps another reason for the High Court's opinion was that European
regard for the SOFA has become correspondingly weaker. Unfortunately, its brief and narrow decision sheds little light on this question.
Even if that factor were not part of its unpublished reasoning, recent
events-particularly Soering-at least potentially undermine the
SOFA's authority in this area. Indeed, those events quite likely will form
the basis for future SOFA assaults.""
After Soering, two particular areas have emerged in which the SOFA
is likely to be narrowly construed or misinterpreted. First, because Soering considered criminal immunity irrelevant to the issue of surrender,
some domestic courts may regard the SOFA as merely conferring criminal immunity and thus consider it entirely inapplicable. The Short
Court, however, did not do that. Second, Soering held that the ECHR

prevails over extradition treaties. Thus, states that have abandoned capital punishment will be tempted to equate SOFA and extradition treaty
surrender obligations and find, by analogy, that Soering should apply
similarly to both. Neither of these propositions is correct.
1. The NATO SOFA: Immunity "Plus"
The NATO SOFA lies somewhere between the two extreme "law of
the flag" and exclusive receiving-state sovereignty theories of visiting-

forces jurisdiction. 135 The article VII language involved in the current
controversy further demonstrates that the SOFA truly is, or at least was
intended to be, a compromise.13 ' In particular, its notions of exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction incorporate mutually favored aspects of both
theories. Although some scholarly attention has been devoted to defining
the status of visiting forces in the absence of agreements like the SOFA,
relatively little has addressed how the nature of that status changed after
the SOFA-particularly article VII's allocation of jurisdiction-entered
134. For an interesting analysis of the Soering decision and its likely future effects,
see Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991). Although this
comment did not consider the effects it might have on the United States military abroad,
Short is clearly one of the many progeny Soering will spawn.
135. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.

136. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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into force.
Perhaps one reason why the nature of article VII has not been examined more thoroughly is that it is a case of first impression. Those

who have studied the NATO SOFA and its operation generally have
concluded that it confers a limited immunity upon members of visiting
forces."3 To the extent that they are subject to the sending state's exclusive or primary concurrent jurisdiction, they are immune from receivingstate prosecution.1"8 This explanation apparently has been considered
satisfactory because it accurately describes the mechanics of the SOFA
process; whenever an offense is committed by a member of a visiting
force, the sending and receiving-state authorities determine whose right
to prosecute prevails. The accused would then be considered immune
from prosecution by the state without jurisdiction. Indeed, the Dutch
criminal and civil courts of appeals reached this conclusion in their Short
decisions."3 9
In Soering, the European Court ordered the United Kingdom not to
extradite Jens Soering to the United States because he faced the risk of
capital punishment. In its analysis, the Court recognized that British
courts could not prosecute the young man because the murders he allegedly committed occurred outside its criminal jurisdiction.1 4 Nevertheless,
Soering's immunity from British prosecution was considered irrelevant to
the question of whether he should be extradited. Although the Court
acknowledged the British argument that its decision would "leave[]
criminals untried, at large and unpunished,"1 41 the additional facts that
the United Kingdom exercised control over Soering, had the discretion to
deny extradition,14 2 and was obligated to protect his human rights under

the ECHR prevented it from extraditing him. Therefore, the question
this conclusion raises is: Will European states now also regard the
SOFA as irrelevant?

Although the Dutch High Court acknowledged SSgt Short's immunity
from its criminal jurisdiction, it did not end its analysis there.143 To its
137. See, e.g., SNEE & PYE, supra note 10, at 61 (analogizing immunities enjoyed by
members of visiting forces with diplomatic immunity); Stanger, supra note 112, at 189,
224.
138. See Stanger, supra note 112, at 158 n. 4.
139. See Message from 32 TFS/JA to HQ USAF/JACI (Nov. 21, 1988) (civil appeal); Message from American Embassy, The Hague, to United States State Department
(Mar. 30, 1990) (criminal appeal).
140. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16.
141. Id. at 33.
142. See id. at 17.
143. See Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [Highest Court],
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credit, it also recognized its absolute SOFA duty to surrender SSgt Short
to United States authorities. Indeed, that is the very conflict the court
attempted to resolve. Although the SOFA accurately describes the allocation of criminal jurisdiction between sending and receiving states, viewing it exclusively in terms of criminal immunity does not address
whether or to what extent the state without jurisdiction is obligated to
surrender the accused to the state with jurisdiction.
2. The "Plus": The NATO SOFA's Duty to Surrender
Once the parties have determined how article VII allocates jurisdiction
in a particular case, the additional matter arises of transferring the accused when the other state exercises custody. Typically, this is not a
problem. The surrender is generally performed very informally, usually
between the states' law enforcement authorities. 1" Although the process
is easy, the underlying obligation to surrender forms the difficult crux of
Short.
Part of the basis for the High Court's decision not to surrender SSgt
Short was its interpretation of Dutch domestic public policy as established in its approach to extradition.14 5 The Court compared its opposition to capital punishment to the death penalty exception in the extradition treaty between the United States and the Netherlands:
In view of the great importance that must be attached to the right not to
undergo the death penalty, that balancing [of our interests in complying
with either the SOFA or the ECHR] cannot turn out otherwise than in
favor of Short. This also accords with the thought which forms the basis
of the practice followed by the State, which is natural for states in which
the death penalty is not known, when concluding extradition treaties with
states where that penalty is known, of including therein a proviso such as
is set forth in Art[icle] 8 of the Extradition Act, as also occurred
in
14
Art[icle] 7 of the Extradition Treaty with the [United States]. 1
Status of forces agreements definitely are not extradition treaties, and,
beyond its value as evidence of Dutch public policy, this analogy is somewhat misplaced. Indeed, the Advocaat-Generaal's brief acknowledged the
The Hague, 1990, Nos. 14.949, 13.950, slip op. at 10 (unofficial translation by United
States Department of State).
144. The Netherlands Supplement to the NATO SOFA allows the United States to
retain custody of military members subject to Dutch exclusive or primary jurisdiction.
See Netherlands Supplement, supra note 127, at annex, para. 3, at 106; Stanger, supra
note 112, at 254,
145. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
146. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990 at 10.
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differences.1 47 The danger after Soering is that European nations will be
more likely to regard extradition treaties and the SOFA as imposing
equivalent duties to surrender.
The concept of extradition in customary international law was often
regarded as a matter "of imperfect obligation" 148 because, in the absence
of treaty or domestic statute, the law imposed upon the requested state
neither a duty to surrender, nor a duty not to surrender. Extradition
between states without a treaty is purely a matter of reciprocity or courtesy. 4 9 Even with a treaty, the obligation between parties to turn over
an accused is not much clearer. Indeed, most treaties contain so many
exceptions and grant the requested state so much discretion that any
duty of surrender that might exist is far from definite. One particularly
relevant and common exception pertains to capital punishment. A good
example is the following provision in the European Convention on
Extradition:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such offense the
death-penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested Party or is
not normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting
Party gives such assurance as the requested Party considers sufficient that
the death-penalty will not be carried out. 150
As the Dutch High Court pointed out, a similar provision exists in the
extradition treaty between the Netherlands and the United States. 5
Against this background of uncertain duties and the exceptions that often

consume them, regarding the NATO SOFA's duty to surrender as
equally weak would not be difficult. If, despite the Advocaat-Generaal's
opinion to the contrary, this was the High Court's view, the strength of
Dutch public policy overpowered its obligation to enforce the SOFA.
Again, the flaw in this approach is that the SOFA is not an extradition
treaty.
Whereas many extradition treaties begin with an overall rule of sur147. See Advocaat Generaal's Brief, supra note 133, at 1380-81. The brief states
that although the duty to surrender is unqualified, this distinction between the SOFA
and the United States-Netherlands extradition treaty is irrelevant. Id. at 1381. Under
Soering, any act by the state that exposes someone to capital punishment violates the
ECHR.

148. J.G.

STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

353 (10th ed. 1989).

149. See id.
150. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11, 359 U.N.T.S.
274, 282.
151. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990 at 10.
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render followed by numerous exceptions and qualifications, article VII,
paragraph 5(a), of the NATO SOFA states simply:
5(a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each
other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their
dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing them over
to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the
above provisions.' 52
Thus, when article VII assigns jurisdiction to one state, this clause creates an unqualified duty of surrender in the other. 153 The SOFA contains no exceptions, and, as the Advocaat-Generaal admits, the surrendering state has no discretion."" The absolute nature of this duty to
surrender is what makes this conflict between the SOFA and the ECHR
seemingly irreconcilable.
D.

The Short Decision as a Violation of InternationalLaw

1. Restriction of Sovereignty by Treaty: Are the NATO SOFA and the
ECHR Really Inconsistent?
Relying on two principal arguments, the Advocaat-Generaal concluded that the SOFA and ECHR are irreconcilably inconsistent. First,
he conceded that the NATO SOFA requires the Netherlands to surrender SSgt Short to United States authorities. He agreed that the United
States had the primary right to prosecute SSgt Short and, consequently,
that the Dutch government had no choice but to surrender him to his
superiors at Soesterburg Air Base.5'
His second argument was that the ECHR also applied and that it
prevented SSgt Short's surrender. 156 Article I of the ECHR provides
that the "High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Conven152. NATO SOFA, supra note 7, art. VII, para. 5(a) at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 78.
153. In addition to the Advocaat-Generaal's brief, United States federal court decisions interpreting this and similar SOFA provisions persuasively support this conclusion.
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 869 (1972); see also
Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 521 (8th Cir. 1971). In Williams, two United States
servicemen fled back to the United States from West Germany, where they had been
assigned and where they had committed offenses under German law. In an effort to
prevent their surrender to West German authorities under the NATO SOFA, both
sought judicial protection in a United States district court. The District Court for the
District of Columbia denied their petition and the court of appeals affirmed.
154. See Advocaat-Generaal's Brief, supra note 133, at 1380.
155. See id. at 1380-81.
156. Id. at 1381-84.
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tion.' 57 The European Commission, he asserted, has interpreted this to
1 58
include anyone under a party's "actual authority and responsibility. 1

Although the SOFA gives the United States primary criminal jurisdiction over Short, the Advocaat-Generaal argued that this did not divest
the Netherlands of its secondary concurrent jurisdiction.15 Because it
still retained this residual jurisdiction, he considered SSgt Short to be
within the Netherlands "actual authority and responsibility" and, therefore, subject to the ECHR's protection. Thus, the Soering Court's injunction that no one may be extradited on capital charges applies here
despite that the SOFA's duty to surrender is not extradition.
Because the High Court did not discuss as fully its bases for ruling
that the ECHR applies to SSgt Short and that this conflict exists, the
Court presumably accepted the Advocaat-Generaal's conclusions and rationale.'6 0 Despite the apparent logic of the Adocaat-Generaal's position,
it has two possible problems. Either of them, if corrected, might allow
the ECHR and SOFA to be read consistently.

The Advocaat-Generaal's key premise was that the Netherlands retains a sort of residual criminal jurisdiction even after the state with the
primary right has attempted to exercise it. First, this view conflicts with
the idea that the SOFA renders a member of the visiting force immune
from receiving-state jurisdiction unless the sending-state waives its pri6
mary right.1 '

A second and more fundamental problem is that his premise is too
limited. Viewing the SOFA only in terms of the immunity it may confer
fails to account for the duty to surrender. 6 2 Although he acknowledged
that duty and admitted that it is unqualified, he did so only before and
after deciding that the ECHR applies to Short. He did not consider it as
he determined whether Short was within the Netherlands "actual authority and responsibility." Had he considered in this context both
Dutch criminal jurisdiction over Short and its duty to surrender him, he
might have found that the ECHR does not apply.
The Advocaat-Generaal cited Serge Lazareff's book, The Status of
Military Forces Under Current InternationalLaw, to support his proposition that the Netherlands enjoyed some residual jurisdiction over
157.
158.

European Convention, supra note 12, at 224.
Advocaat-Geneaal's Brief, supra note 133, at 1382.

159. Id.
160. The High Court did render a brief opinion regarding the ECHR's application
to SSgt Short. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990 at 6-7. The Court clearly agreed with the
Advocaat-Generaal's analysis.

161. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
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SSgt Short. Lazareff does contend that in its exercise of unlimited terri-

torial sovereignty, a receiving state enjoys "a general right of jurisdiction
over members of a [visiting] force, on the assumption that a sovereignstate could not accept not to punish an offence committed on its territory,
lest it be a violation of its sovereignty." 16 The SOFA limitations on
these general receiving-state rights, however, suggests that it somehow
also limits its territorial sovereignty.
The examination of exclusive receiving-state jurisdiction and immunity supports a view that allocation of authority between sending and
receiving states is a zero-sum 164 task. In other words, to the extent that
one sovereign allows another to exercise jurisdiction within its borders,
no matter how narrow the grant of jurisdiction, the state's territorial
sovereignty, exercise, or both are equally restricted."" This notion of restrictive sovereignty is not revolutionary. 66 Indeed, Chief Justice Mar-

shall's rationale for the inability to attach a foreign warship in The
Schooner Exchange was that otherwise "exclusive and absolute" territorial sovereignty may be self-limited. 6 Also, the principle that receivingstate courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over sending-state courtsmartial is based, at least in part, on the idea that they are authorized
acts of visiting sovereigns. Finally, this phenomenon is apparent in the
context of the NATO SOFA's article VII: to the extent that an accused
is subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the sending state, the accused
also is immune from prosecution from the receiving state, and vice versa.
Against this background, a reasonable argument is that a state that
signs a treaty with an unconditional duty to surrender places yet another
restriction on its sovereignty. Under the zero-sum analogy, adding the
duty to surrender to the constraints already imposed by the sending
state's primary right should limit even further the receiving state's otherwise-plenary territorial jurisdiction. Together, they carve out an area

163. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 17.
164. "In game theory, designation of a situation, competition []in which a gain for
one must result in a loss for another or others." WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY
1653 (2d College ed. 1974).
165. See Stanger, supra note 112, at 91. Conceivably, two states could exercise jurisdiction simultaneously or consecutively with respect to an individual offender. The
NATO SOFA, however, has rendered that extremely difficult. See NATO SOFA, supra
note 7, art. VII, para 8, at 1802, 199 U.N.T.S. at 80. This provision prevents an accused, who has been tried and acquitted or convicted in the courts of either state, from
suffering prosecution again at the hands of the other. This makes the zero-sum analogy

even stronger.
166. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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over which the receiving state's discretion and authority no longer extend. The Dutch appeals courts, by holding that the Netherlands lack of
criminal jurisdiction also deprived it of jurisdiction under the ECHR,
recognized that this case fell within that area.
The decisions of several international tribunals, including the European Commission of Human Rights, support this view. Despite the Advocaat-Generaal's conclusion that the Commission has expanded the

scope of ECHR protection, 68 these cases demonstrate that the convention does not apply to situations in which its parties have no independent
authority or discretion.
In a 1975 case, Hess v. United Kingdom," 9 the Commission considered whether it could order the United Kingdom to release Nazi war
criminal Rudolf Hess from Spandau Allied Prison in Berlin. After
World War II, the four major Allies-the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union-agreed to administer the
prison on a rotating basis and to require unanimous agreement before
effecting any changes. Although three of the four parties agreed that
Hess should be released, the Soviet Union's veto continued his imprisonment. This arrangement, the Commission decided, gave the United
Kingdom the right to participate in the prison's joint administration.
Even during the United Kingdom's annual three-month supervision of
the prison, the four-power agreement constrained its discretion and prevented it from unilaterally releasing Hess. Because it was bound by this
agreement, the Commission rejected the application as a matter not
"'within the jurisdiction' of the United Kingdom, within the .meaning of
'170
Article 1 of the Convention.
The European Commission dealt similarly with another case involving
the question whether the Federal Republic of Germany was responsible
for the decisions of the Supreme Restitution Court, an international tribunal established in West Germany after World War II to adjudicate
war claims.171 Although Germany was a member of the tribunal, the
Commission held that the ECHR did not apply because that nation's
discretion in matters before that court was limited by its agreement with
its other members. As support for its decision, the Commission pointed
to the Salem Case in the United States-Egyptian Mixed Arbitral Tribu-

168. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
169. Application No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72 (1975).
170. Id. at 74.
171. X v. The Federal Republic of Germany, No. 235/56, 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur.
Cony. on H.R. 256 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
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nal of 1932 (the Tribunal). 17 2' Faced with a similar issue, the Tribunal
held that Egypt was not responsible for the decisions of the mixed courts
established by agreements between Egypt and foreign nations to hear
cases involving foreigners. The court stated:
The jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts was instituted and is continued not
only through the will of the Egyptian State, but by conventions concluded
with the Capitulatory Powers. Both parties, by executing these conventions, sacrificed part of their sovereignty. The Capitulatory Powers gave
up a part of their jurisdictional prerogative on Egyptian territory by waiving the civil jurisdiction of their consults. The Egyptian Government gave
up a part of its sovereignty by undertaking to accept in civil cases ... the
jurisdiction of a court composed of a majority of foreigners. The responsi-

bility of a state can only go as far as its sovereignty in the same measure
as the latter is restricted, that is to say as the state cannot act in a free and
17
independent manner, the liability of the state must also be restricted. 1

The Hess case addresses another important conflict-of-treaties concern.
The Commission recognized that an issue justiciable under the ECHR
might arise if, after entering the ECHR, a member state also became
party to an international agreement that limited its discretion in a manner inconsistent with its prior obligations. In other words, it considered
that the ECHR might prevail over a later-conflicting treaty. It agreed,
however, that the Allies concluded the four-power prison agreement well

before the ECHR and understood that, despite the conflict, "unilateral
withdrawal from [the prison] agreement [would not be] valid under international law."'1 74 Thus, the Commission did not demand that the conflict be resolved in favor of the ECHR. Importantly, the Netherlands
ratified the NATO SOFA on November 18, 1953111 and the ECHR on
August 31, 1954.176
Since the Advocaat-Generaal and the High Court relied heavily on

Soering, the question remains whether it has changed this restrictive sovereignty principle. It has not. The European Court in Soering was just
172. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1958-59 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 296
quoting The Salem Case, (U.S. v. Egypt), 6 Ann. Dig. 188, 198.

173, The Salem Case, 6 Ann. Dig. at 198. These opinions are clear: When international agreements place situations outside a particular state's discretion, international
tribunals, including the European Commission, consistently have considered them also
outside their authority. When that state's later actions are consistent with those agreements, but inconsistent with the ECHR, the Commission has decided that the ECHR
does not apply.

174. Hess v.United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 74.
175. 199 U.N.T.S. at 68 n.1.
176. 213 U.N.T.S. at 222 n.1.
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as conscious of the United Kingdom's conflicting treaty obligations as
was the European Commission in the two cases above. States have far
more discretion not to surrender an accused under an extradition treaty
than under the NATO SOFA. 177 Recognizing the extent of that discretion, the European Court stressed in its opinion that the United StatesUnited Kingdom extradition treaty allowed the British government not
to surrender Soering unless it received adequate assurances that he
would not face capital punishment. 7 Although denying the United
States request would frustrate the objectives of extradition and allow
Soering's considerable crimes to go unpunished,27 9 the United Kingdom
could avoid that, too, by surrendering him to West Germany. Thus, the
European Court held that the United Kingdom, faced with these options
under its extradition treaties, must select one consistent with its ECHR
obligations.1 80
Soering and the cases above teach the same lesson: When a state has
the discretion to act in a manner consistent with the ECHR, it must do
so. When, as in Soering, a state has the right to refuse to extradite someone facing the death penalty, the ECHR requires it to exercise that
right. When, as in Hess, an earlier agreement limits the state's discre-

tion, the ECHR does not apply because the matter is not within the
state's "actual authority and responsibility." The SOFA's allocation of
jurisdiction and duty to surrender clearly put Short into this latter category. This category is one in which both the SOFA and ECHR can still
coexist peacefully.

177. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
178. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (sev. A) at 17-18, 35. "[T]he decision by a
Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3." Id. at
35.
179. Id. at 35.
180. Id. at 35-36. The ECHR and the United States-United Kingdom extradition
treaty, however, were not really inconsistent at all. The Society did not lose sight of this

when it acknowledged that:
[i]t
must be stressed that in the Soering case there was no obligation to put the

individual at the disposal of the [United States] judicial authorities. Moreover,1
the bilateral extradition treaty also provided for the possibility for the extraditing
state to request a guarantee that the death penalty would not be carried out. The
issue of possibly conflicting treaty obligations was therefore not at stake.

Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 13.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24.867

2. International Treaty Law: The Vienna Convention on Treaties and
Customary International Treaty Law
Because the SOFA limits the Netherlands discretion not to surrender
SSgt Short, ample precedent supports construing the ECHR as inapplicable to his case. After Hess and X v. Federal Republic of Germany,
that is one way the two treaties can be read consistently. It is also one
reason why the SOFA's renegotiation should not be considered inevitable. Several other reasons also exist.
Putting the restrictive sovereignty argument aside, to assume that the
SOFA and ECHR both apply and conflict also is to conclude that international law offers no solution. In particular, the Advocaat-Generaal,
the Dutch High Court, and the Society each inquired to varying degrees
whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8 ' offers an answer. All agreed that it did not. 18 2 Hess contained one pre-Vienna Convention suggestion that a state should not be held accountable for its
actions inconsistent with the ECHR when a prior treaty limits its discretion. Perhaps another look at the Vienna Convention or customary international treaty law will reveal something equally enlightening to support
the United States position.' 8 3
In 1969 at Vienna, the United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties adopted the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The
treaty did not enter into force for eleven years and, to this date, the
United States still has not ratified it. Despite this, President Nixon acknowledged in his letter transmitting it to the Senate for ratification that
it "is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current

181. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 697 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The treaty, although adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties on May 22, 1969, did not enter into force until January 27,
1980. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, at 144.
182. Of these three inquiries, the most superficial was the High Court's inquiry. Its
opinion jumped almost directly from discussing the treaty conflict to deciding how it
could be resolved under its own public policy and domestic law. Its opinion devoted little
analysis to the question whether the Vienna Convention might provide a solution. Its
failure to discuss the issue might have resulted because the Advocaat-Generaal directed
more effort to that area. In the discussion that follows, this Article will use his brief as a
springboard to consideration of the international treaty law aspects of this problem.
183. By its terms, the Vienna Convention does not apply to the two treaties here.
Article 4 of the Convention states that it "applies only-to treaties which are concluded by
States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such States."
Vienna Convention, 8 I.L.M. at 682. Nevertheless, the convention's character as codification of customary international treaty law gives it persuasive and independent legal
authority.
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treaty law and practice." 1 4 Thus, although the United States may not
take advantage of the Vienna Convention's dispute resolution system in

situations like this, it does recognize the persuasive and legal authority of
its rules.
Perhaps the most widely recognized and accepted principle of international treaty law is the concept of pacta sunt servanda. Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention codifies this principle, stating that "[e]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith."1'85 Unfortunately, starting our inquiry here offers no hope of
resolving this conflict. The Advocaat-Generaal came to the same conclusion when he confronted this principle at the end of his analysis. Since
both the ECHR and SOFA are treaties, pacta sunt servanda does nothing more than remind us that both are "binding" and "must be performed ... in good faith." Indeed, that is the dilemma.
Greatest hope for a solution lies in the Vienna Convention's conflict of
treaties rules. During its preparatory work, the International Law Commission (the Commission) understood that the proliferation of treaties
someday would likely result in both intentional and unintentional conflicts.1 88 Among the rules it drafted to deal with them was one based on
the principle pacta tertiis non nocent: "[I]n the relations between a state
that is a party to both [conflicting] treaties and a state that is a party
only to the earlier treaty, the earlier treaty prevails.118 7 In describing its
customary law basis, the Commission said that this principle "can hardly
be open to doubt, as [it is] the assumed basis of law upon which many
revisions of multilateral treaties ... have taken place." 18 Another draft
rule codified the principle lex posterior: "[I]n the relations between a
State that is a party to both treaties, and a State that is party only to the
'
later treaty, the later treaty prevails." 189

At the time of the Vienna Convention's formal adoption, the Commission proposed that both rules be applied only to conflicts arising out of
successive treaties relating to the same subject matter. In its final draft to
the Law of Treaties Conference, the Commission commented that these
1

184. S. EXEC. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971), quoted in RESTATEMENT,
supra note 83, at 145.
185. Vienna Convention, supra note 181, at 690.
186. See generally Draft of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, [19641 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 40-43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/Add.1 [hereinafter 1964
Draft Convention].
187. Id. at 40.
188. Id.
189. Id. An almost identical provision is codified at article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 181, at 691.
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principles should be limited to avoid any risk that the rule codifying lex
posterior might be misinterpreted as allowing "the conclusion of a treaty
incompatible with obligations undertaken towards another state under
another treaty."' 9 0 In other words, it wanted to avoid the negotiation of
later, inconsistent treaties. Clearly, its goal was to maintain the integrity

of pacta sunt servanda. Unfortunately, limiting lex posterior in this
way also limited pacta tertiis non nocent, a principle already in accord
with that objective. In their limited form, both are now part of article 30
of the Vienna Convention. 91
The Advocaat-Generaal concluded that since the ECHR and SOFA
do not relate to the same subject matter, article 30's codification of pacta
tertiis non nocent does not apply. He ended his discussion there. He did
not inquire whether the underlying principle might apply independently
of the Vienna Convention.
Clearly, the watered-down article 30 does not apply to this situation.
Pacta tertiis non nocent, however, should. The Vienna Convention does
not address every possible treaty issue that might arise. Therefore, the
lacunae must be filled by customary international law. The Commission
recognized the strong basis of pacta tertiis non nocent in customary international law, as it was applied in Hess. 92 After determining that article 30 did not apply, the Advocaat-Generaal also referred to customary
law. His analysis, however, focused only on the concept of lex posterior.
After correctly concluding that it also does not apply here, his inquiry
ended. It ended too soon.
One aspect of article 30, paragraph 4(b) is that parties to a later
treaty may not deprive earlier treaty partners of their rights without
their consent.1 9" That is also the purpose of the customary pacta tertiis
non nocent.14 The only difference between them is that article 30 is

190. 3 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties at 34, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/I1/Add.2, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.5 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Vienna
Conference].
191. Article 30, paragraph 4(b), states that when "the parties to the later treaty do
not include all the parties to the earlier one . . . as between a state party to both treaties
and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties
governs their mutual rights and obligations." Vienna Convention, supra note 181, art.
30, para. 4(b), at 691.
192. See supra notes 169-176, and accompanying text. In Hess, the European Commission recognized the conflict between the four-power prison agreement and the
ECHR. It deferred to the earlier four-power treaty, but added that it probably would
not have done so had the ECHR been concluded first.
193. See 1969 Conference, supra note 190, at 36.
194. See 1964 Draft Convention, supra note 186, at 40.
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limited artificially. While article 30's terms prevent it from resolving this
conflict, its underlying principle survives in customary international law.

This principle should be applied here. If applied, it would render the
ECHR inapplicable to the extent that it conflicts with the earlier
SOFA.1 95
E. United States Policy
The crux of the High Court's decision in Short was that Dutch public
order demanded that it protect SSgt Short from the risk of capital punishment." 6 Just as the Netherlands has its own public order based upon
its domestic and international human rights obligations, the United
States has public policy concerns underlying its objection to the Short
decision and its likely reluctance to renegotiate the NATO SOFA. Although the High Court performed a ritualistic balancing of its ECHR
and NATO SOFA obligations, its approach left little doubt that the former would prevail. The Society's focus is similar. Both appear to be
concerned about whether the NATO SOFA still is consistent with the
Netherlands interests. If this were a treaty about to be signed or if the
issue was whether the Netherlands ought to remain a party to it, this
one-sided debate might be acceptable. This treaty, however, has been in
force for almost forty years. Therefore, any discussion of its re-examination and possible renegotiation ought to take into account the interests of
its other parties. In the context of the Short case, the other relevant party
is the United States.
1. The NATO SOFA Negotiations: The Original United States
Concerns
The SOFA's relatively smooth operation today stands in distinct con-

trast to the controversy it generated during and immediately after its negotiation. Throughout World War II, the United States held sacred the
fundamental principle that its military forces, wherever deployed, were

195. In the lex posteriorcontext, the Netherlands arguably violated its obligations to
its ECHR partners by deferring to the SOFA. While this is true, the Commission was
careful to add to its codification of both the lex posterior and pacta tertiis non nocent
principles that they apply "in the relations between a state that is party to both treaties"
and a state that is party only to the later or earlier treaties, respectively. In the Short
situation, the relations are between the Netherlands and the United States. Thus, the
SOFA-the earlier treaty to which both are parties-applies to the exclusion of the
ECHR. No other state is involved.
196. See supra Section II and infra Section IV.
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subject to its exclusive criminal jurisdiction.19 7 Given the United States
favored status, none of the Allies disputed that claim.19 After the war,
however, some of the Western European nations that were to become the

members of NATO, faced with the prospect of having foreign troops on
their soil for the foreseeable future, insisted that jurisdiction over them
be shared.199
Just as strongly as NATO's European alliance considered shared jurisdiction necessary to preserve its own public order from the possible
excesses of foreign troops, the United States balked at the prospect of
losing any measure of control over its forces. While the rest of the treaty
drew only passing notice during its Senate ratification hearings, article
VII raised considerable concern.200 After a long history of maintaining
exclusive jurisdiction over its troops-a history that included its recent
victory in the largest war to date-the NATO SOFA would subject its
military personnel to the courts of another nation. To some in Congress,
that idea was unthinkable."0 '
At the NATO SOFA negotiations, the primary United States concerns
were that its military members should not be exposed to the risk of cruel
and unusual punishment at the hands of foreign criminal laws and judicial systems and that discipline must be maintained. 2 Maximizing
United States jurisdiction over our military members abroad would satisfy both. While the interests of the Europeans obviously have changed
significantly over the past forty years, the United States interests have
not. Although the United States does not worry about cruel and unusual
punishment in most of Europe, as the predominant sending state within
NATO, its concerns about uniform treatment remain essentially the
same, and the SOFA's formula still meets them. Thus, the United States
197. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.

198. See Barton, supra note 6, at 200.

199. See id. at 205-07.
200. See generally Supplementary SOFA Hearings, supra note 8.
201. In the ratification hearings, the SOFA's primary opponent appeared to be Senator Bricker. His objection to the treaty focused on its jurisdictional provisions. His opposition was reflected in the reservation he proposed:
The military authorities of the United States as a sending State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the members of its force or civilian component and their de-

pendents with respect to all offenses committed within the territory of the receiving
state and the United States as a receiving state shall, at the request of a sending
state, waive any jurisdiction which it might possess over the members of a force or
civilian component of a sending state and their dependents with respect to all offenses committed within the territory of the United States.
Id. at 3.
202. See supra notes 6-10.
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probably would be reluctant to renegotiate it.
How the NATO SOFA would be changed to accommodate Europe's
human rights concerns is unclear. Two likely possibilities would be either to specifically prohibit capital punishment in cases arising under the
SOFA or to further limit the jurisdiction of sending states whose laws
still provide death penalties. For the following reasons, both probably
would meet United States opposition.
2.

The Death Penalty

The Short decision represents an ironic reversal of positions in the
NATO SOFA: the United States allies now worry that the United States
will subject its citizens to cruel and unusual punishment. A critical question in any debate about changing the NATO SOFA to prevent capital
punishment is whether the United States is willing to change the status
quo. Although a similar debate over the death penalty rages within the
United States, most of its criminal justice systems-including the military's system-clearly still consider the death penalty important.
20 3
Although death is a possible punishment for some federal crimes,
under the United States federal-state system, most criminal law is defined and enforced by the individual states. The federal government,
which would negotiate any NATO SOFA amendments, has become involved in the capital punishment debate primarily through its judicial
decisions. In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, the United States
Supreme Court went so far as to invalidate Georgia's death penalty statute.2" 4 The Court's ruling that this statute was unconstitutional had the
added effect of striking down death penalty statutes in all other states
then permitting capital punishment.20 5 Although Furman struck a
strong blow against the death penalty, the most significant aspect of subsequent events was the haste with which these states corrected their stat-

utes' constitutional defects, thereby re-establishing their capital punish208
ment schemes.
The states that retain capital punishment today do so despite constant

challenges and opposition. Their persistence is evidence of the death penalty's perceived value. The military has encountered and overcome simi203. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (providing the possibility for the imposition of
the death sentence for intentional killings occurring in the course of a continuing criminal enterprise).
204. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
205. See Kevin K. Spradling & Michael D. Murphy, Capital Punishment, the Con-

stitution, and the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 32 A.F. L. REv. 415 (1990).
206.

See id. at 416.
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lar obstacles. Its capital punishment provisions are contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a federal statute, 07 and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984, an Executive Order.2 08 They were

revised most recently in 1984 after the United States Court of Military
Appeals struck down the previous manual's death penalty provision in
United States v. Matthews.20 9 Although no military member has been
executed under the UCMJ since 1961,210 the armed forces, like the
states, want to keep this option available.
3. The Expansion of Military Criminal Jurisdiction
Any suggestion that the NATO SOFA should be changed to limit
United States jurisdiction over capital crimes would run headlong into
the current trend of expanding military jurisdiction within the United
States. For eighteen years-between 1969 and 1987-military courtmartial jurisdiction was limited. Outside of the United States, it was, and
continues to be, constrained by the many SOFAs to which the United
States is a party. In a 1969 opinion, O'Callahan v. Parker,z 1 the
United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution further limited
court-martial jurisdiction over military personnel to crimes that are "service connected." Specifically, it ruled that a military person's off-base
sexual assault on a civilian with no military connection could not be
tried by court-martial. 1 2 In 1987, however, the Court reversed
2 13
O'Callahanin Solorio v. United States.

The Solorio court held that the only requirement for court-martial
jurisdiction is that the accused must have been "a member of the Armed
Services at the time of the offense charged.

'214

The basis for the Court's

expansion of military jurisdiction was its recognition that Congress is
responsible for determining what courts-martial may consider and that
Congress had determined that the accused's military status was the only
relevant jurisdictional factor. 21 5 The Court also recalled that George

Washington seems to have shared this view.216 Since 1987, all military
207.
208.
28,825
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 et. seq. (1988).
See Exec. Order No. 12773, amended by Exec. Order No. 12484, 49 Fed. Reg.
(1984), reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984.
16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
See Message from HQ USAF/JAJM to HQ USAFE/JA (July 27, 1988).
395 U.S. 258 (1969).
Id. at 273.
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
Id. at 451.
See id. at 440-441; see also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
In a General Order dated February 24, 1779, President Washington stated that
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members, wherever located, have been subject to the UCMJ. The only
limits now are those imposed by
the allocations of jurisdiction in agree217
ments like the NATO SOFA.

One of the objectives of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is to
provide uniform criminal standards for all United States military members. 218 This goal, however, is achievable only if the UCMJ is enforced
against as many military members in as many situations as possible.
That, of course, is also an objective of SOFAs. The fairness that the
relationship between uniformity and maximizing jurisdiction seeks to
achieve would be jeopardized by prohibiting capital punishment or curtailing United States jurisdiction under the NATO SOFA. Unless the
death penalty is abolished entirely under the UCMJ, either of these suggestions might cause a fairness problem of constitutional proportions: all
military members except those in Europe would risk death for capital
crimes.
IV.

THE DUTCH POSITION: THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The United States position in Short is based in large part on wellaccepted principles of black-letter international law.2" 9 In contrast, the
Dutch view is more controversial because it is based on the emerging
jurisprudence of human rights-a body of international law that was in
its infancy when the NATO SOFA entered into force.
Much of Section III focused on how the Netherlands violated the
NATO SOFA procedurally and substantively. It also argued that a narrower reading of the ECHR was not only' appropriate, but that it also

would have avoided the violation of either treaty. Given the strong basis
of those propositions in international law, two of the few remaining arguments supporting the Dutch position are that the norms embodied in
"[a]ll improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier being destructive of
good order and discipline as well as subversive of the rights of society is as much a
breach of military, as civil law and as punishable by the one as the other." Solorio, 483
U.S. at 445 n.10, (quoting 14 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 140-41 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1936)).
217. Although all military members within the United States are subject to the
UCMJ, they may not actually be tried by court-martial for every serious offense. Military authorities still share jurisdiction with local authorities, and, depending on the nature of the offense, the case may be tried by either. Manual For Courts-Martial, United
States (1984) (as amended), R.C.M. 201(d)(2).
218. See, e.g., DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 2-3 (2d ed. 1987).
219. See supra Section I.
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the ECHR are superior to the SOFA's or that the latter treaty is no
longer binding in cases like Short. Together, they form the basis of the

Society's proposal that the SOFA be revised.
This Section briefly introduces the European human rights system as
established under the ECHR, the foundation of the Dutch position.
Next, it will examine the status of that system and its enumerated rights
in international law. In that context, three questions are relevant: Has
opposition to capital punishment reached the level of jus cogens? If not,
can it be considered as a higher norm in some sort of hierarchy of international norms? Third, what is its role and effect as a principle of Dutch
public policy? Unfortunately, the Dutch High Court's decision in Short
provided little analysis. Therefore, the answers to these questions are
derived from arguments that were made to the Court, the Society's propositions, and attempts to fill in the gaps. Finally, this Section will explore the treaty law principle of changed circumstances to determine
whether evolving human rights law justifies the High Court's avoidance
of the NATO SOFA.
A.

Human Rights Generally: A Background

After Short, the Netherlands clearly considers members of visiting
forces subject to the ECHR. Also, the Society contends that during the
thirty-seven years both the NATO SOFA and the ECHR have been in
force, they have evolved in opposite directions. To resolve this resulting
conflict, it concludes that the SOFA must be reconsidered. This argument reflects the increasing role of human rights law in Europe. To
better understand the Dutch perspective, an understanding of European
human rights is necessary.
1. The Human Rights Movement

The appearance of human rights in international law occurred primarily as a result of the "atrocities committed against humanity by the
fascist powers during the Second World War. '220 Before and during that
war, various groups and individuals, shocked by the heinous acts of the
Nazis, began the process that ultimately resulted in the adoption of the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).2 2 '
Having opened the floodgates, this declaration ultimately led to the mul-

220. Imre Szabo, HistoricalFoundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11, 21 (UNESCO
ed., 1982).
221. Id.
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tiple treaties now governing human rights.

To supplement the individual human rights treaties that have been
negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, some states have
united on a regional basis to improve the conditions of their peoples. In
addition to the European regional system,2 22 the Americas and Africa
have also established frameworks in which human rights have been established and enforced.223
The speed and vigor with which the international community has pursued the establishment of international human rights law has led some to
question whether it is progressing too fast. Whereas most of the rights
that have been proclaimed by the United Nations or by human rights
treaties have evolved from the pursuit of liberty, the world is now approaching the point at which its thirst for new rights is almost insatiable.224 This, together with the reality that many states that are parties to
these human rights treaties have abysmal human rights records, has
strained the system's credibility. Perhaps these are reasons why the
United States has been reluctant to ratify many of the human rights
treaties that have been negotiated.22 5
Despite the United States "unilateral stance on the subject of human
rights," 22 6 it is sensitive to its own record and the compliance records of
other nations. This is most evident in its foreign policy. 227 Overall, the
United States and the Netherlands feel equally strong about the impor-

tance of human rights. Their only differences, perhaps, lie in their definitions of what those fundamental rights are and in how they manifest
their concern.

222.

See infra notes 219-30.

223.

See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of

Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 439 (Theodor Meron

ed., 1984).
224. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposalfor
Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984) (examining the problem of declaring
new rights by the United Nations and offering suggestions on how to regulate procedurally the declarations of rights).
225.

See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

IN DOMESTIC COURTS 8 (noting the United States has "an exceptionally poor ratifica-

tion record insofar as international human rights treaties are concerned").
226.

DAVID P. FORSYTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

2 (1988).
227.

See id.
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The European Human Rights System

Dutch human rights law and policy are based primarily on the European Convention on Human Rights. 228 That treaty, which the Netherlands signed on November 4, 1950 and ratified on August 31, 1954,229 is

one of the cornerstones of the European Community. It also is widely
considered to be the world's most effective regional human rights enforcement system. 2 0 Although its success has been attributed mainly to
the homogeneity of its Western European parties,231 their common
World War II experiences no doubt also contributed greatly to their
resolve.
The ECHR is divided into two primary parts. First, it lists the rights
and freedoms its contracting parties must secure for "everyone within
their jurisdiction. 2 3 2 This language is extremely important because it
defines the scope of the ECHR's protection, which the Dutch High
Court construed broadly to cover SSgt Short. 3 ' Second, the ECHR establishes a structure within which those rights and freedoms may be enforced.28 4 While the ECHR's enumerated rights and freedoms are similar to those found in other major human rights documents, its
enforcement system distinguishes the European model from all others.
The ECHR established two organs and incorporated a third to form
the nucleus of its enforcement mechanism. The European Commission of
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the preexisting Committee of Ministers-the governing body of the Council of
Europe-work independently, but in concert, to consider and act upon
state and individual complaints of human rights violations. The Commission is the first body to receive the complaints. If it regards a state or
individual petition "admissible," it investigates the underlying allegations
and establishes its findings in a report to the Committee of Ministers.
Judging the admissibility of a complaint is an important aspect of this
process because it is the threshold that separates frivolous from substantial petitions. Although complaints must satisfy several requirements, the
two most important are: first, that the state or individual complainant

228. Id. at 222 n.1.
229. European Convention, supra note 12.
230. See European Convention on Human Rights, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA
INTERNATIONAL LAW 184, 191 (1985).
231. See id.
232. European Convention, supra note 12, arts. 1, 2-17, at 224-234.
233. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
234. European Convention, supra note 12, arts. 19-56, at 234-48.
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must have exhausted all domestic remedies,"'5 and, second, that the individual complainant must claim to be a victim of a human rights violation
committed by one of the ECHR's parties. 23 6 The Dutch High Court in
Short considered that SSgt Short might satisfy both criteria if the Court
23 7
decided to surrender him to United States authorities.
If, after the Commission's investigation, the parties are unable to settle
their dispute informally, the Commission submits its final report to the
Committee of Ministers.2 3 The ECHR then provides the Commission
and any interested state party a three-month period during which they
may refer the matter to the European Court of Human Rights (the
Court).23 9 If the matter is referred to the Court, it decides whether the

ECHR was violated. Otherwise, the Council of Ministers renders final
judgment.240
3.

Capital Punishment and the ECHR

Ironically, when the ECHR entered into force on September 3,
1953,241 it did not prohibit capital punishment. Rather, listed first
among the document's protected human rights is a "right to life" provision that specifically allows the death penalty: "Everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law." 242 Because the
NATO SOFA entered into force less than two weeks earlier,243 on August 23, 1953, much of Western Europe presumably shared this view of
capital punishment during the ECHR's negotiation.
During the SOFA negotiations, the states knew that sending-state
courts-martial might sentence offenders to death for certain offenses. Although neither international nor European law prohibited capital punishment, some European receiving states had either formally abolished or
discontinued it in peace, war, or both. Thus, hope was expressed that
sending states would not carry out death sentences within their territo235.
236.
237.
commit

Id. art. 26, at 238.
Id. art. 25, at 237-38.
Indeed, the Dutch Advocaat-Generaal concluded that the Netherlands would
a "tort" against SSgt Short if it turned him over to the United States. See Advo-

caat-Generaal's Brief, supra note 133, at 1387.
238. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 31, at 240.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. art. 32, at 240.
Id.
See id. at 222 n.1.
Id. art. 2, at 224.
SNEE & PYE,supra note 10, at 7.
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ries. 2 " In deference to these states, the final treaty contained article VII,
paragraph 7(a): "A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State by the authorities of the sending State if the legislation of the
receiving State does not provide for such punishment in a similar
case." 2 45 Under this compromise, the NATO allies understood that when
the sending state has jurisdiction to prosecute, it has the right to impose
any sentence its laws deem appropriate; the SOFA limits only its execution within a receiving state whose laws do not allow "such punishment
in a similar case." Until Short, no objection to the imposition of a death
sentence had ever been sustained.
Although the ECHR originally allowed capital punishment, the 1983
Sixth Protocol (the Protocol) called for its abolition. The Protocol stated
simply that "the death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed."2'46 To date, many European
NATO nations, including the Netherlands, have signed or ratified it.
Issues exist, however, of whether this development supports the Society's
argument that Western Europe's view of human rights has changed sufficiently to warrant corresponding changes in the SOFA and whether the
SOFA no longer requires receiving states to surrender members of visiting forces who risk execution under sending-state law.
B.

Is the Right Not to Face the Death Penalty Normatively Superior
to the SOFA's Duty to Surrender?

1. Normative Superiority as a Matter of International Law
The first of the Society's two principal arguments favoring re-evaluation of the NATO SOFA is that the "influence of international agreements with relation to human rights within the legal system[s] of states
[has] increase[d] steadily. '2 47 Not only has the influence of international
human rights law increased, but many argue that it also has grown in
stature. One particular view that has recently become prominent, albeit
controversial, is that some international human rights norms are actually

244. See, e.g., Status of Forces Agreement-Norwegian Note on the Death Penalty
under Article VI of the Draft, MS-D(51) 10, (Feb 16, 1951), reprinted in NATO
Travaux Preparatoires,supra note 8, at 383.

245. NATO SOFA, supra note 7 at art. VII, para. 7(a), at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at
80.
246. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Europ. T.S. No.
114, art. 1, at 2.
247. Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 5.
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superior to other international laws.2 48
The basic idea that international law ranks some norms ahead of
others is not a new one. The idea's most widely-accepted form is the
familiar principle of jus cogens. Codified at article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, jus cogens contemplates that treaties
at variance with certain universal "peremptory norms" are automatically
void.249 Such norms are "rules from which States are not competent to
derogate at all by a treaty arrangement, and which may be changed only
by another rule of the same character."2 50 In other words, they take precedence over all other international laws.
Professor Weil of the University of Paris argues that jus cogens is
gradually leading to the further "graduated normativity" of international
law. 51 Historically, international norms created either by treaty or by
custom were equally binding. "There was no distinction ... to be made
between one legal norm and another. '252 The principle of jus cogens,
however, "with its distinction between peremptory and merely binding
norms," 253 has now led to the question whether a hierarchy among
nonperemptory norms also exists. Professor Meron suggests this hierarchy within international human rights law may exist and
describes two
2
possible levels: fundamental rights and ordinary rights. 5"

The concept of fundamental rights is an international transplant from
domestic law. National constitutions commonly describe those rights that
a government may not abridge. Also common are domestic rights of
lesser status. United States law provides good examples of both. On the
one hand, the United States Constitution gives great deference to fundamental rights; any government interference with them is subject to "strict
scrutiny" by the courts. 255 On the other hand, courts review the abridgement of rights not regarded as fundamental-ordinary rights-under a
much less stringent standard.2 56 Although this same dichotomy may exist
in international law, it is not nearly so well-defined. Since international
law does not have a constitutional or legislative process by which some

248.
249.
250.

See id. at 12-13.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 181, art. 53, at 698-99.
1969 Vienna Conference, supra note 190, at 67.

251.

Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J.

L. 413 (1983).
252. Id. at 421.
253. Id.

INT'L

254. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of InternationalHuman Rights, 80 AM. J.
L. 1, 5 (1986).
255. John E. Nowak, et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384 (1978).

INT'L

256.

Id.
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rights are classified as "fundamental" and others as "ordinary," the dis2 57
tinction is blurred.
Meron suggests two ways to distinguish fundamental rights from ordinary international human rights. One necessary, but insufficient, attribute of fundamental rights is that they are obligations erga omnes. 6 8 A
second characteristic, closely related to the first, is that they "must be
firmly rooted in international law."2 5 9 Meron adds that "mere claims or
goals, important as they may be, would not qualify."'2 60 On the surface,
these standards seem straightforward. The problem, however, is that
they suffer the same plight as the standards defining peremptory norms:
How does the international community determine whether a particular
norm satisfies them?2"' Unfortunately, a definite answer does not appear
to exist.
Assuming that rights can be considered peremptory, fundamental, or
ordinary, the next challenge is to determine the consequences of classification. 2 Jus cogens makes peremptory norms superior to all others.2 6
Thus, in conflicts between peremptory and other norms, the former will
always prevail. When fundamental rights conflict with ordinary rights or
other international norms, authorities are split as to what law will prevail. In 1983, the Institute of International Law convened at Cambridge
to discuss, among other matters, the relationship between human rights
and extradition. 26 The conferees' consensus appeared to be that custom-

ary international law has evolved to the point at which "the duty to
protect human rights . . .justif[ies] non-extradition.1 2, 5 One conferee
narrowed this slightly by defining human rights as "basic rights of the
human person"-in other words, fundamental human rights. 266 Despite
the arguments underlying the United States position, some support exists
for the proposition that some human rights fall short of peremptory status but still supersede other international norms. The crucial question

257. See Commentary to Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n, pt. 2 at 73, 85-86, reprinted in Meron, supra note 254, at 8.
258. See Meron, supra note 254, at 8-9. In other words, they are obligations owed,
by every state to all other states. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 702, cmt. o.
259. Meron, supra note 254, at 11.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 18.
262. See id. at 22.
263. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
264. New Problems of the InternationalLegal System of Extradition With Special
Reference to Multilateral Treaties, 60 Y.B. INST. INT'L L. 213 (1983).
265. Id. at 214.
266. Id. at 234 (statement of H. Mosler).
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for our purposes is whether SSgt Short's right not to suffer capital punishment supersedes the Netherlands SOFA duty to surrender him. The
Dutch answer, of course, is that it does.
2. Jus Cogens and International Ordre Public
If the right not to face capital punishment were a peremptory norm,
the Short case would not have triggered a dispute. That right clearly

would have taken precedence over the SOFA duty to surrender, and the
case would have closed without comment. That this did not happen
strongly suggests that the jus cogens principle does not apply here. To
determine when the right not to face capital punishment does apply, a
consideration of why it is not a peremptory norm is useful.
In addition to the idea that peremptory norms supersede all norms of
lesser importance, jus cogens sometimes also refers to international ordre
public, the principle that some public policies exist that states may never
violate.267 The international ordre public is comprised of principles and
rules that are so vitally important to the world community that any contravention of them by unilateral action or agreement cannot have legal
force. 26 8 The reason for this follows simply from logic: "the law cannot
recognize any act either of one member or of several members in concert,
as being legally valid if it is directed against the very foundation of
law."2' 69 Although the scholars who have linked jus cogens and ordre
public admit that some differences exist, the critical similarity is that
both are concerned with principles that form the "foundation of [international] law."' 270 Most agree that the right not to face the death penalty is
not an ordre public.
The Society itself acknowledges that capital punishment has not
achieved that exalted status. 27 ' The Restatement goes much further, stating that not only is capital punishment not considered a violation of a
peremptory norm, but it has not even been "recognized as a violation of
the customary law of human rights. ' 27 2 It cites article 6 of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant) as authority for this conclusion. Article 6 states that capital punishment may "be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
267. See Meron, supra note 254, at 19-20; H. MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY 17-19 (1980).
268. Id.
269. MOSLER, supra note 267, at 18.
270. Id.
271. See Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 12-13.

272.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 83, § 702, crnt. f.
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the commission of the crime. "273 Thus, it recognizes that many states
have not abolished the death penalty.
Finally, even the Soering court agrees. The European Convention al74
lows capital punishment under conditions similar to the Covenant's.
The Sixth Protocol abolishing the death penalty has yet to be accepted
fully by all European Community members. Both of these factors led the
Soreing court to conclude that capital punishment per se does not violate
the ECHR.278
The Restatement suggests two qualifications of peremptory norms:

they must be "recognized by the international community of states as a
whole," and their peremptory character must be accepted.2 7 Because
neither is satisfied here, the right not to face capital punishment is not a
peremptory norm.
3.

Capital Punishment and Fundamental Rights

The second and final step in the hierarchy analysis focuses on the
question whether capital punishment violates a fundamental right. Since
it does not violate a peremptory norm, the right not to face the death
penalty could not be superior to any other international norms unless it
can be considered fundamental.
This step is also very difficult. One of the underlying assumptions thus
far has been that the right not to face capital punishment is an international norm at some level. As the previous section demonstrated, this assumption may be incorrect. The Restatement asserts not only that capital
punishment violates no peremptory norms, but also that it is not inconsistent with other international laws.2 77 Before considering whether this
is a fundamental right, it must be determined whether it is even a right.
International law's two primary sources are treaties and custom. 278
Clearly, the Sixth Protocol establishes the right not to face capital punishment as a matter of treaty law within the European Community. The
Soering court suggests that this right may also be rooted in European
customary law.
In its amicus curiae brief to that court, Amnesty International argued

273. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75.
274. See supra notes 241-46, and accompanying text.
275. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-41.
276. RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 331, cmt. e.
277. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
278. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, art. 38, 51 Stat.
1031, 1061, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187.
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that there is a "virtual consensus in Western European legal systems
that the death penalty is, under current circumstances, no longer consistent with regional standards of justice." 27 9 The court agreed, but held
that the Sixth Protocol embodied the European Community's articulation of that premise. If a particular state-like the United Kingdom-did not ratify that protocol, it would not be bound by that customary law.2 80 Perplexing though this holding may be, it at least appears to
affirm that the abolition of capital punishment is a European norm-an
example of a special or regional custom binding at least among the states
party to the Sixth Protocol. 28 ' Among these states, then, the right not to
face capital punishment is a right arguably guaranteed by both treaty
and custom. This, however, merely raises another preliminary issue: the
role of regional norms in international law.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered a similar question in the Asylum Case between Colombia and Peru.28 2 Colombia
sought a judgment compelling Peru to grant safe exit to a Peruvian political 6pposition leader to whom the Colombian Embassy in Lima had
given asylum. One of Columbia's arguments was that the practice of
diplomatic asylum had become' a customary regional norm of interna-

tional law. The Court ultimately found that the practice had not crossed
the customary law threshold. The Court suggested, however, that if it
had, it would have governed the parties' relationship.
The Court's suggestion was implied in the test it used to determine
whether diplomatic asylum was customary law. The test, derived from
article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, states that the "party which relies on
a custom ... must prove that [the custom] is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party."2 3 This is done, in
turn, by proving that the rule "is in accordance with a constant and
uniform usage" by the other party-practice-and that this practice is
the expression of the invoking party's right and the other party's
duty-opinio juris.2' Applying this test to the facts in the Asylum Case,
the ICJ found the parties' practice inconsistent and considered their obli-

279. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40. Although the European Court
did not employ the term "customary law," its discussion suggested that this was the
context in which it examined this question.
280. Id.
281. For an excellent discussion of the distinctions between "special" and "general"
custom in international law, see Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Special Custom
in InternationalLaw, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1969).
282. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
283. Id. at 276.
284. Id.

926

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 24.867

gation more a matter of political expediency than of duty. Applying the
same test to the right not to face capital punishment in Europe among
the states that have adopted the Sixth Protocol, it seemingly is a right
based both on treaty and regional customary law.
In Professor Meron's two-part test, two attributes of a fundamental
right are its erga omnes character and that it is firmly rooted in international law.285 Within the European Community, the right not to face the
death penalty is erga omnes as a matter of treaty-all members can enforce it against one another. The strength of its roots presents a more
difficult problem. Certainly, many European Community states feel
strongly that capital punishment is wrong, including the Netherlands.
The Soering court, however, suggests that the right's roots are deeper in
the Sixth Protocol than in regional custom. The problem is that no one
really knows how firmly these rights must be fixed for them to be considered fundamental. If the right not to face capital punishment does not
qualify now, perhaps it is only a matter of time before it will. The
Dutch have a good argument that it is fundamental now.
Assuming, arguendo, that this right is fundamental in European international jurisprudence, the issue still remains whether it outranks the
SOFA duty to surrender. The Institute of International Law suggests
that fundamental human rights supersede the duty to extradite.2.88 The
Netherlands could argue that this is also true when
those rights are de28 7
fined only in regional customary or treaty law.

Whether norms are recognized only regionally or generally, their
binding effect on states within the region is equally strong. The Soering
decision is ample proof of that. The Dutch might say that whether this
norm binds the United States is irrelevant because its conduct is not at
issue here. 8 8 Since SSgt Short was in Dutch custody, only the Netherlands decision to surrender him is relevant, and this norm limits the

285. See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text. As a matter of hierarchy of
international norms, extradition and the SOFA duty to surrender are identical, but
neither could reasonably be considered fundamental in the sense that we have defined
that term.
287. On the one hand, the opposing norm-the SOFA's duty to surrender-is also

regional in scope. On the other hand, the underlying concept pacta sunt servanda is part
of general international law, the principle that is arguably at stake here.
288. In the Asylum Case, Colombia sought to apply a regional customary norm to
regulate Peru's conduct, but the ICJ held that the norm was not sufficiently customary to
bind Peru. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text. Here, however, the Netherlands is not seeking to enforce a regional rule against the United States; it merely recognizes that the rule applies to itself.
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Netherlands discretion. The Netherlands might add that violation of this
norm could subject it to criticism and, possibly, sanctions from its European Community partners. The standard they 'Would apply is this re-

gional norm. The Dutch High Court has already acknowledged that the
SOFA also imposes an obligation, but concluded that it is not of equal
stature. The fundamental character of SSgt Short's right not to face capital punishment must prevail.2 89
This argument is appealing, especially from a human rights perspective. It fails to consider, however, that the United States is involved in
this matter. Although its conduct is not at issue, its authority over one of
its nationals is. The treatment of one state's nationals by another has
always been a concern of international law. 290 An equally persuasive argument, then, might be that the validity of the Netherlands acts concerning Short are subject to the law in force between it and the United
States. Customary international law would apply unless a special agreement or custom existed between them.2" 1 Since regional European norms
do not bind the United States and a special treaty relationship-the
NATO SOFA-does exist, the United States could just as effectively argue that this special or regional custom cannot supersede the SOFA.
C0.

Is the Right Not to Face the Death Penalty Superior to the

SOFA's Duty to Surrender as a Matter of Intertemporal Law?
1. The Temporal Element of International Law
Intertemporal law involves the relationship between earlier and later
international laws. For example, article 30 of the Vienna Convention on
Treaties allows two or more treaty partners to change their mutual obligations by subsequent treaty. 2 2 The presumption is that more recent
289. Although the Dutch High Court did not use this framework to compare the
SOFA's duty to surrender and Short's right not to face capital punishment, its holding

captured the essence of the distinction between them. It said that "[i]n view of the great
importance that must be attached to the right not to undergo the death penalty, that
balancing [between that right and the SOFA duty to surrender] cannot turn out otherwise than in favor of Short." Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990, Hoge Road de Nederlanden
[Highest Court], The Hague, 1990, Nos. 13.949, 13.950, slip op. at 10 (unofficial translation by United States Department of State),
290. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Lich. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
291. See D'Amato, supra note 281. Professor D'Amato argues that the ICJ in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, established this rule. It upheld Norway's unilateral
delimitation of its fisheries jurisdiction because it was reasonable "in light of general
customary practice," and the United Kingdom had no special agreement or custom defining a contrary relationship with it. Id. at 221.
292. See Vienna Convention, supra note 181, art. 30, at 691. No individual party or
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norms supersede older, inconsistent ones.
The intertemporal relationship among treaty norms and among customary norms is relatively well established. Just as newer treaties may
modify older ones, modern state practice may change old customary in-

ternational laws."' Similarly, the Restatement acknowledges that later
custom may supersede earlier inconsistent treaties and vice versa. 294 In
this relationship, however, treaties clearly have stronger effects. The Restatement accepts the principle that customary law and treaties are
equally authoritative in international law.29 5 "Unless the parties evince a
contrary intention, a rule established by agreement supersedes for them a
prior inconsistent rule of customary international law .... A new rule of
customary law will supersede inconsistent obligations created by earlier
agreement ifthe parties so intend and the intention is clearly manifested."2 9 Thus, the Restatement presumes intent to supersede earlier
international law in a treaty, whereas it must be expressed in a new
customary rule.
This concept of intertemporal law raises two relevant questions. First,
has the ECHR and specifically its Sixth Protocol superseded the NATO
SOFA? Second, has the customary human rights law that arguably has
evolved from the ECHR modified the SOFA's duty to surrender in capital cases? The first question can be disposed of quickly. Since the United
States is not a party to the ECHR or its Sixth Protocol, article 30 prevents either treaty from affecting its SOFA relationship with the Netherlands. The second question, however, is much more difficult.
2. The Temporal Relationship Between Capital Punishment and the
SOFA's Duty to Surrender
Recall that the right not to face capital punishment is arguably a European regional norm that binds all parties to the Sixth Protocol.29 7 It is
also a right the Dutch High Court clearly considers fundamental. 9 Its

hierarchical superiority over the SOFA's duty to surrender, the Dutch
might contend, makes this latter duty unenforceable. A similar temporal

group of parties may conclude a subsequent treaty binding on a state that is party to the
earlier treaty, but not the later one.
293. See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary InternationalLaw: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11-20 (1988).
294. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 102, cmt. j.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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argument might also be made.
Although many European nations had already abolished capital punishment before the NATO SOFA entered into force, if it crystallized into
a customary regional norm at all, it did so only recently.2 9 In addition to
being later in time, however, temporal superiority also depends on the
clearly manifested intention of the parties that the new customary norm
supersede the old treaty."'0 This is the difficult part. The United States

is obviously not a party to this new customary regional norm. Also, until
Short, whether anyone anticipated, much less intended, that the Sixth
Protocol would supersede the SOFA is doubtful. Nevertheless, every
practice must begin somewhere, and the Dutch might argue that the
temporal superiority of the right not to face capital punishment is now
clearly manifest.
That the United States is not a party to this new customary norm
poses greater problems in the temporal sense than it did in the normative
context. 30 ' In the normative situation, the United States status might not
matter because the fundamental nature of the right not to face capital
punishment limited the Netherlands actions regardless of its relationship
with the United States. Assuming here that this right and the duty to
surrender are equal in stature, to say that a new regional custom displaces an earlier nonregional treaty would be to undermine the entire
pacta sunt servanda principle. This precedent would allow any group
of nations to avoid its treaty obligations merely by conjuring up a contrary customary rule. Therefore, this temporal argument probably would
not carry much weight in international legal circles and probably is not
worth pursuing further.
D.

The Relationship Between Domestic and InternationalLaw

Just as jus cogens and international ordre public define legal principles deemed vital to the international community as a whole, 302 domestic
ordre public or public policy is a set of principles fundamental to the
domestic legal order. The right not to face capital punishment has not

risen to the jus cogens level. 3 ' Therefore, this right is neither a peremptory norm, nor an element of the international ordre public. The Society
argues, however, that Dutch adherence to the ECHR and other human
rights agreements has created a body of domestic law that, in Short, ran
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 102,
See supra Section IV(B).
See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying
See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying

text.

cmt. j.
text.
text.
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counter to its SOFA obligations. The Society raises the question whether
that body of domestic law has become such a part of the Dutch domestic
ordre public that its national judges may ignore contrary international
30 4
laws or obligations.
The relationship between domestic and international law is a reciprocal one. According to the most widely-accepted view, international law is
part-in most cases, a superior part-of the domestic law of each state.
That generally is the position shared by the United States and the
Netherlands. More controversial, however, is the proposition that domestic law might prevail over contrary international law. That is the basis of
the public policy argument.30 5
The "Netherlands Formula" for waiving primary concurrent jurisdiction illustrated that domestic public policy has a role in international
law. 308 This supplement to the NATO SOFA between the United States
and the Netherlands establishes a blanket Dutch waiver of primary jurisdiction under article VII. The waiver effectively gives the United
States primary jurisdiction unless the case is "of particular importance"
to the Netherlands.30 7 In other words, the United States has primary
jurisdiction over most cases unless Dutch public policy concludes otherwise. The United States refusal to waive its primary right in Short also
exemplifies the role of domestic public policy in international law. The
United States principal rationale was that its military policy prevented
this waiver.30"
That domestic law plays a role in international law and vice versa
seems obvious. What is of concern in the Dutch position in Short and in
its future as a NATO partner is the extent to which it can rely on its
public policy to insulate it from future cases like this.
1. Domestic Public Policy in International Law
Throughout its history, public policy is a concept that has generated
considerable controversy.3 0 9 Although traditionally used as a conflict of
304. See Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 6-7. Ordre public and public
policy are slightly different concepts with slightly different origins. The differences, how-

ever, are so slight as to be insignificant. Therefore, they will be treated as equivalent
concepts and the term "public policy" will be used to refer to both. See Ken Murphy,
Note, The TraditionalView of Public Policy and Ordre Public in PrivateInternational
Law, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 591, 592 (1981).

305. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
306.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.

307. Netherlands Supplement, supra note 127, para. 3, at 106.
308. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.

309. See Murphy, Note, supra note 304, at 592.
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laws principle allowing courts not to give effect to foreign law repugnant
to domestic morality and social order,"' 0 the Society suggests that it now
may govern the "extent [to] which public international law is applied by
national authorities." 3 1 In either application, the Society has recognized

the common concern that "whether a particular foreign rule falls under
the ban is a matter of opinion, which can easily become a matter of
whim."" 2' Because public policy is so subjective and amorphous, and because it has been abused by result-oriented courts, 31 3 many Western
judges and scholars have called for its elimination, restraint, or
revision. 1 4
Although the Society recognizes that any use of public policy in public
international law necessarily must be limited, it also suggests that the
doctrine is attractive to states otherwise faced with the unpalatable application of distasteful international legal principles. The Society notes that
states have begun to employ public policy-type arguments more frequently "whenever issues of major concern to their national legal order
arise. ' 131 5 Two bases of the public policy concept illustrate why the Society considers it relevant and applicable to cases like Short.
"The earliest and most enduring use of public policy is to reject morally repugnant law." 31 6 This observation reflects the most basic reason
why public policy as a factor of judicial decision-making will never be
entirely eliminated. This basis, however, has become less important in
recent years because international law has addressed and corrected the
most repugnant domestic laws and practices.31 7 Nevertheless, capital
punishment remains. Therefore, the Society and the Dutch High Court
would argue that the domestic use of public policy also must continue.
Another common purpose of public policy is the prevention of injustice
to parties before courts3 8 Courts using public policy in this manner
seek to avoid unjust results by refusing to apply unjust laws. Obviously,
the High Court resolved its dilemma in Short-whether to deliver Short
to United States authorities, possibly to face death--by refusing to en-

310. See id. at 591.

311. Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 7.
312. Id. at 7 (quoting P.B. Carter, Rejection of ForeignLaw: Some PrivateInternational Law Inhibitions, 1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 125).
313. Murphy, supra note 304, at 592.
314. See id. at 600-03; Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 7.
315. Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 8.
316. Murphy, supra note 304, at 607. This observation was'made during a 1981
symposium on conflicts of law at the University of Georgia.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 608.
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force the NATO SOFA. Prevention of an unjust result played an important role in that decision.
Clearly, most states, including the Netherlands and the United States,
have concepts of ordre public or public policy. These fundamental,
nonderogable principles often influence courts not to give effect to contrary laws. Whether states ought to invoke public policy against international laws, particularly against their own treaties, will be considered
next. The point here is that apparently they do.
2. International Law in Domestic Public Policy: The Netherlands Ordre Public
Human rights play important legal and moral roles in the public order of Europe. Recognizing that other European nations likely share its
concern, the extent to which these principles have been incorporated in
the public policy and domestic law of the Netherlands is of interest here.
Most United States lawyers are familiar with two prevailing schools
of thought regarding the efficacy of international law in domestic law.
The monist view contends that only one system of law exists, "of which
international and domestic law are no more than two aspects."3 " Accordingly, international law is superior to domestic law and, when they
conflict, the former will prevail.320 The dualist view, however, regards
the two kinds of law as distinct and separate. When they conflict, domestic law generally will prevail over international law.3 2 ' Although the dualist state recognizes that its failure to abide by its international obligations may give rise to international responsibility,32 2 the dualist state's
constitution typically makes this result unavoidable. From a public policy standpoint, then, the dualist state seemingly would be far more likely
than the monist state to invoke domestic law and public policy as bases
for avoiding unattractive international laws or obligations. The Netherlands, however, defies that conclusion.
In this scheme, the Netherlands generally is considered to be a monist

state. Articles 65 and 66 of its Constitution have been interpreted to require that self-executing international agreements supersede all contrary
domestic laws. 23 Its courts agree. Indeed, case law that has developed
319. PAUL
320. Id.

SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 40

321. Id.
322. See, e.g.,

(1983).

RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § l15(1)(b) ("That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic law
does not relieve the United States of its international obligation.").
323. See ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION
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since the ECHR entered into force has required Dutch courts to examine all Netherlands laws for compatibility with the convention. The
result of this systematic review is that most of the ECHR's provisions
are now considered to be superior to domestic law. 24
As for public policy, states that place international agreements above
their own domestic laws arguably should find impeaching them difficult
with something as amorphous as domestic public policy'. Furthermore,
monist states should have no contrary public policy since any agreements
they enter into are presumed to be in their best policy interests. These,
however, are the Society's points. When it ratified the NATO SOFA,
the Netherlands considered the treaty consistent with its public policy.
That changed with the development of its public policy against capital
punishment. If this policy shift had been due solely to a change in domestic attitudes or law, the High Court might have turned Short over to
United States military authorities. 25 Dutch public policy also was based
on its adherence to the ECHR, and this gave it overwhelming force.
The High Court dearly relied heavily on two levels of public policy in
its refusal to comply with the NATO SOFA. 2 ' First, it identified the
Court's duty to conform to international public policy:
In the case at hand, consideration should be given in this balancing to
Short's interest, on the one hand, in not suffering any violation of his
right, guaranteed by the [ECHR] in connection with the Sixth Protocol,

not to be exposed to the death penalty ... and the State's interest, on the

IN DOMESTIC LAW 88 (1983). "Self-executing" generally means that the international

agreement or its relevant provision must be enforceable without domestic implementing
legislation. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 111.
324. Id. at 89-90.
325. The High Court declined to consider whether article VII of the NATO SOFA
was self-executing because it considered that factor irrelevant. Judgment of Mar. 30,
1990, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [Highest Court], The Hague, 1990, Nos. 13.949,
13.950, slip op. at 9 (unofficial translation by United States Department of State). Nevertheless, its recognition that the SOFA is a treaty the Netherlands is bound to follow
suggests that the SOFA should be considered superior to any conflicting domestic law.
326. The most revealing statement in the entire Short decision was the High Court's
focus on the domestic and international policy interests at issue:
What [is] at issue ... is the question of whether, based on all the circumstances of
the case, and balancing the interests involved-including the national and international interests which are involved with complying with both treaty obligations-the treaty obligation in question [the NATO SOFA duty to surrender]
forms such a weighty obstacle for the State to fulfill its obligation toward the citizen in question [obligations under the ECHR], that fulfilment of its obligation
toward that citizen cannot be demanded of it and thus cannot be ordered.
Id. at 9-10.
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other hand, in fulfilling its obligations toward the U.S. derived from the
NATO Status [of Forces] Agreement, as well as the international interests
which are involved in a more general way in a proper compliance with the
NATO Status [of Forces] Agreement. In view of the great importance that
must be attached to the right not to undergo the death penalty,
that bal3 27
ancing cannot turn out otherwise than in favor of Short.
In the High Court's view, international public policy mandated that priority be given to Short's human rights. The court articulated its view of
domestic public policy by pointing to Dutch extradition treaties. Its government's standard practice is to require assurances from requesting
states that surrendered fugitives will not be subject to capital punishment.3 28 Both domestic and international public policies, as the Court
perceived them, required the Court to defer to the ECHR.
In light of Soering and Europe's views of human rights, this result is
not surprising. These views, however, are significant changes from the
pre-Sixth Protocol views of capital punishment. This evolution and the
regard that the Netherlands and other European nations show their international obligations as superior to domestic law indicate that it is only
a matter of time before the Short public policy rationale results in more
cases like Short.
E. Arguments in InternationalTreaty Law: The Vienna Convention
on Treaties and Customary InternationalTreaty Law
The High Court's outright rejection of the SOFA has at least two
legitimate alternatives with fairly solid foundations in international law.
Both, however, would lead to a result contrary to perceived Dutch do-

mestic and international public policy. The Society has pointed to
changed circumstances and public policy as reasons why the SOFA must
be re-examined and, ultimately, renegotiated. International treaty law
addresses both of these reasons.
1.

Changed Circumstances

Whereas the principles of pacta tertiis non nocent and lex posterior
are rules of treaty conflict resolution, changed circumstances generally
applies only in treaty suspension or termination. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention defines the concept and its effects:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard
to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was

327. Id. at 10.
328. Id.
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not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform
the extent of obliga29
tions still to be performed under the treaty.
The International Law Commission translated this article into five conditions for treaty termination or suspension:
(1) the change must be of circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty; (2) that change must be a fundamental one; (3) must
also be one not foreseen by the parties; (4) the existence of those circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (5) the effect of the changes must be
radically to transform the scope of obligations still to be performed under
the treaty.330
Although the Vienna Convention applies these criteria only to treaty termination or suspension, they are also relevant to treaty renegotiation. On
the one hand, if changed circumstances fall short of this standard, they
will not justify termination or suspension of a particular treaty. They,
however, may form a purely optional basis for a treaty's revision. On the
other hand, when they are sufficient to terminate or suspend a treaty,
changed circumstances also will compel the parties to renegotiate it if
they consider their relationship worth maintaining.
The United States would argue that circumstances have not changed

sufficiently to compel renegotiation. Assuming that the ECHR's Sixth
Protocol is a fundamental change of circumstances that satisfies the second criterion above, any other criteria's application is doubtful. First, the
change must also be "of circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty." As seen earlier, the NATO allies understood during
the SOFA negotiations that some European receiving states had abolished the death penalty.331 Hence, article VII, paragraph 7(a), provided
that death sentences would not be carried out in these states. 3 2 The
Sixth Protocol really goes no farther than that. The only change it imposed was that abolition of capital punishment became an international
obligation instead of a purely domestic one. Although that change has
now rendered adherence to the SOFA more difficult, the United States
might contend that it does not make it impossible. Therefore, the Sixth
329. Vienna Convention, supra note 181, art. 62, at 703.
330. 1969 Vienna Conference, supra note 190, at 79.
331. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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Protocol arguably is not a change at all.
The United States might also argue that the third, fourth, and fifth
criteria are similarly inapplicable. These criteria raise questions concerning whether the Sixth Protocol's abolition of capital punishment in Europe was foreseeable and whether the absence of this obligation was an
assumption underlying the SOFA parties' consent. Because the SOFA
and the ECHR were negotiated almost simultaneously, arguing that the
former did not contemplate the latter would be difficult. 3 Also, although the Sixth Protocol is relatively new, the SOFA's parties not anticipating its development is extremely unlikely; they had already taken
into account the domestic abolition of the death penalty.
Despite all this, the Dutch might still persuasively argue that circumstances have changed sufficiently to compel the SOFA's renegotiation.
Although the possibility may be true that the SOFA parties considered
and accommodated domestic views of capital punishment, the Dutch
could contend that they could not have foreseen that the right not to face
death would rise to the level of a fundamental regional human right or
become an element of the Netherlands public order. In other words, Europe's view of capital punishment has changed. Little doubt would exist
that if the right not to face capital punishment had become a peremptory
norm during the past forty years, it certainly would supersede a contrary
treaty. That is the principle codified in article 64 of the Vienna Convention.334 Using this analogy, the change in the depth with which this right
is now felt in Western Europe possibly is a fundamental change-a
change that might warrant the SOFA's suspension.
Besides its controversial basis, the main problem with this argument is
that the Dutch themselves probably would not accept it. Neither the
Dutch High Court nor its Advocaat-Generaal even remotely considered
the possibility that changed circumstances might terminate the Netherlands participation in the SOFA. Nevertheless, the Society suggests that
the Short case arising at all is sufficient reason to re-examine the
SOFA. 3 5 Seemingly, that is the proper conclusion. The circumstances
surrounding the SOFA have clearly changed to some extent. Though
they are probably insufficient to warrant the SOFA's suspension, they
can certainly be used as a basis for its voluntary re-examination.

333. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
334. Vienna Convention, supra note 181, art. 64, at 703.
335. See Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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2. Reliance on Domestic Law or Public Policy as a Reason for Treaty
Violation
Implied in the principle pacta sunt servanda is one of the Vienna

Convention's most basic rules: parties "may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,' 33 6
Presumably, this means that a state may not invoke its domestic public
policy either. This, however, is still an area of considerable debate.
Although the Society acknowledges that international law does not
sanction this agreement, the Society suggests that, as a practical matter,
"states already invoke defenses like

. .

. 'public order'" to avoid specific

like. 3 7

treaty obligations they do not
Clearly neither the Vienna Convention, nor customary international treaty law, allows a state to rely on
domestic law or policy to avoid its treaties. Thus, no legal justification
for the Society's call for SOFA re-evaluation exists. Factually, however,
its argument is hard to dispute. Whether legal or not, public policy is
and will continue to be of fundamental importance to individual states.
The United States certainly stands upon firm legal ground when it
demands Dutch compliance with the SOFA. Perhaps the United States
is being hypocritical, however, when it refuses to recognize the important
roles public policy and domestic law play in its own treaty relations.
The United States has long been regarded by many states as an oftenreluctant treaty partner. Although it always takes its international treaty
obligations seriously, its status as a dualist state occasionally compels it
to violate them. A dualist state regards international and domestic law as
separate regimes. When they conflict, domestic law will prevail.388 While
the United States rarely goes that far, it does maintain that although
33
international agreements are regarded as part of United States law, 1
they can be enforced domestically only if they are self-executing, 3 0 not

contrary to the Constitution,"'1 and not inconsistent with any later federal statute.3 42 In other words, United States policy as expressed in acts
of Congress supersedes inconsistent international agreements. Its international obligations are not thereby relieved.3 43 Nevertheless, domestic
courts will refuse to enforce prior treaties over later inconsistent domestic

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Vienna Convention, supra note 181, art. 27, at 690.
Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 14.
See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 111.
See id.
See id. § 115(3).
See id. § 115(l)(a).
See id. § 115(1)(b).

938

laws.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 24.867

344

The United States might violate its international obligations when
they conflict with its Constitution or later domestic statutes, but it understands and expects that it may be held responsible by its treaty partners.
No doubt the Dutch High Court realized that as well. Indeed, the credibility of international law would suffer greatly if states that violate their
treaties are not held accountable. In that context, public policy should
not be regarded as a legal excuse for treaty breach. The United States, as
part of the international community, has a right to be outraged about the
Netherlands SOFA violation in Short. Given its own background, however, United States indignation cannot be righteous.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Richard Lillich recently wrote that "[like the proverbial
pebble thrown in the pond, Soering will cause ripples for some time to
come."M4 6 Certainly, the same can be said for Short. Indeed, Short is
both one of Soering's ripples and a pebble in itself. Other, like-minded
European states likely will consider it a precedent upon which they can
rely to advance their own human rights concerns.
A.

Resolving the Arguments. Is the Short Decision Valid Under
InternationalLaw?

One of this Article's primary objectives is to examine both sides of this
complex problem. In that regard, one of the questions considered is
whether the Short precedent is valid in international law. Although both
the United States and the Netherlands have some good arguments supporting their positions, Short is not valid. Both states agree that the
Dutch High Court decision resulted in violation of the NATO SOFA.
Short fails because this breach was not legally justified.
Although not actually advanced in Short, the primary United States

argument should be that the ECHR and the SOFA are not inconsistent
treaties. The SOFA, as does the earlier agreement, limits the scope of the
later ECHR's application. Since the Netherlands had no discretion over
visiting force members over whom it exercised no criminal jurisdiction, it
could not regard them as subject to the ECHR's protection. This concept
of restrictive sovereignty has been affirmed by the European Commission
on Human Rights in at least two cases. Also, customary international
law prevents states from enforcing later obligations inconsistent with

344. See, e.g., Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
345. Lillich, supra note 134, at 128.
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prior treaties, and clearly only something quite extraordinary could justify this violation.
The Society -argues that both the fundamental nature of human rights
and the Netherlands ordre public are extraordinary. Certainly, the
Dutch could argue persuasively that the right not to face capital punishment has become a fundamental regional norm. As such, the courts of
the states within that region may be bound to give it precedence over
these ordinary norms as exist in the NATO SOFA. This, however, is
essentially the same type of approach the United States takes when its
courts are constrained to give effect to its Constitution or later legislation
when either conflicts with its international obligations. Since the United
States is not bound by that regional custom or treaty, all that this
amounts to isan attempt to justify this SOFA violation by reliance on
domestic law. It has no basis in international law.
B.

Goals and Possible Solutions

Despite the conclusion that Short has a very weak basis in international law, its practical foundation is quite strong. Indeed, the Society
admits that "although there is no purely legal justification available, in
practice states already invoke defenses like 'fundamental change of circumstances' and 'public order' in a political sense. The development of
such a defense in law might take some time. 3' 4 6 Even though the United
States might stand on solid legal ground, as a practical matter, future
situations like Short are likely to end in the same way. How can it move
beyond this impasse?
A major assumption throughout this Article is that the United States
and the Netherlands considered the entire Short fiasco unacceptable.
Therefore, neither state will ever want to face it again, and some sort of
change is necessary. To determine what sort of change both states might
accept, their goals first must be identified.
1. The Mutual Goal of Maintaining a Strong Alliance
The one apparent constant in this dilemma is that both the United
States and the Netherlands recognize the SOFA's value as a tool that has
effectively managed sending and receiving-state relations for forty years.
The United States particularly understands that but for the SOFA, it
would enjoy no criminal jurisdiction over its troops abroad. The Netherlands probably would admit, and other European NATO allies presumably would agree, that the relationship the SOFA has established has
346.

Society Background Paper, supra note 2, at 14.
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been equally beneficial for them. Therefore, keeping that treaty intact is
in everyone's best interests. It is in the United States interest to resist a
formal SOFA change because any permanent modification would probably reduce, not increase, its jurisdiction abroad.
To protect this interest of maintaining friendly relations, each side
could adopt the extreme measures of fully accepting the other's position.
In other words, the United States could consent to a SOFA provision
abolishing capital punishment or the Netherlands could discontinue its
objection to death sentences in these cases. The mutual anxiety and intransigence that surrounded Short indicate that neither alternative is
likely. The Society suggests that the SOFA itself provides a potentially
acceptable interim solution. Its jurisdiction waiver provision could be invoked by one state to request the other's waiver of its primary right
when the prosecution interests of the former are "of particular importance. 313

7

Unfortunately, the success of this idea is just as remote. Recall

that the Dutch twice attempted to secure the United States waiver of its
jurisdiction over Short, and both requests were denied. As things stand,
the United States apparently will continue to maximize its jurisdiction.
Assuming that neither side will compromise its policies to accommodate the other's, the question remains whether some sort of external
standard could be applied objectively to situations like this. Certainly,
the NATO SOFA's jurisdictional formula provides one standard. This
fails to account for the European aversion to capital punishment. The
treaty still would create an impasse in cases like Short. Resort to European public policy would no doubt raise equally strong United States
objections. The amorphous nature of any standard based on the receiving
state's public policy essentially would render any decision totally within
its discretion.
2. Accommodating the Unilateral Goals of Human Rights and Military Discipline
Any acceptable solution must accommodate not only the mutual objective of maintaining a strong alliance, but also the unilateral European
goal of human rights and the United States goal of maintaining military
discipline. None of the above options does that. Taking all of these factors into account, the most practical approach for sending and receiving
states is merely to continue handling situations like Short on an ad hoc
basis.
Not only is this solution practical, it can also be flexible if coupled
347.

Id.
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with the sending and receiving states' willingness to compromise. This
impasse has been caused not so much by the SOFA's language, as by
each state's own internal policies and concerns. These policies and concerns vary among our NATO allies. Therefore, permanent modification
of the SOFA's allocation of jurisdiction is unnecessary when this easier,
less drastic option is available. Continuing the ad hoc approach will allow the United States, when it negotiates jurisdictional matters with nations less devoted to the abolition of capital punishment, to compromise
less and to rely fully on the SOFA as it is currently written. When,
however, it deals with states like Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands,
compromise probably will be necessary.
Finally, the success of any solution, especially one based on compromise, also will depend ultimately on the access both the sending and
receiving states have to the facts of a case. Part of the problem in Short
was that the Dutch courts refused to allow United States authorities to
conduct their own investigation. Ultimately, after the High Court's decision, the United States Air Force was permitted to hold a formal hearing, in which Short's crime was found not to satisfy the capital statute.3 48
Much of the two-year delay could have been easily avoided if the Dutch
courts had allowed the United States to exercise its treaty rights.
C. How the Case-by-Case Solution Should Work
Having advocated compromise, full and fair disclosure, and dealing
with situations on an ad hoc basis instead of modifying the SOFA, what
kind of compromise is appropriate and how all of these factors should
mesh must still be determined.
Today, when a case comes to the attention of either the sending or
receiving state, the other is typically informed immediately, and both set
upon the task of determining to whom the SOFA allocates primary jurisdiction. In all but potentially capital cases, this will continue unchanged.
When a member of the visiting forces has committed a capital crime
under inter se or official duty circumstances, the SOFA vests primary
jurisdiction in the sending state. Its first challenge to securing that jurisdiction will be to overcome whatever concerns the receiving state may
harbor regarding capital punishment.
After Short, the probability is unlikely that receiving states such as the
Netherlands will allow the United States to take custody of a capital
offender. In the interest of full and fair disclosure, however, they should
allow the sending state to conduct a full inquiry, even a pretrial hearing,

348. See supra note 28.
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to determine whether charges should be brought and, if so, what those
charges should be. In Short, this first step might have resulted in noncapital charges. Certainly, that would have avoided all of these problems.
If, after the investigation, the sending state intends to charge the offender with a capital offense, it should use all the arguments available to
secure the defendant's custody. Again, this will be easier in some receiving states than in others. In states that refuse to surrender the offender,
the sending state is faced with the same choice that faced the United
States in Short: to forego capital punishment and to prosecute the military member or to allow the soldier to remain in a state that, like the
Netherlands, punished a murderer with a six-year sentence.34 9 This is
when compromise is needed.
The goals of military discipline and justice are advanced only by allowing the sending state to maximize its jurisdiction. Although the
SOFA allocates this jurisdiction in only a limited number of cases, the
supplementary agreements the United States has negotiated with most
receiving states allow it to widen that scope considerably. Comparing
this dominant concern that it prosecute its own members with the fact
that it has not executed a single person since the early 1960s, the death
penalty itself is clearly not as critical to the United States military's
maintenance of discipline as is its ability to punish its own. If deterrence
is a cornerstone of discipline, capital punishment would enhance discipline far less than a six-year sentence would destroy it. All things considered, when faced with a situation like Short, the United States compromise ought to be that it will forego capital punishment so that it may
punish the offender appropriately.
D. Some Closing Thoughts
Some may say that asking the United States to compromise is tantamount to advocating its retreat in the face of a clear violation of international law. Rather than condoning clear violations of the NATO SOFA,
this proposal merely suggests that rather than abrogating or forcing its
allies to withdraw from the treaty as a result of cases like Short, the
United States should accept the reality of the underlying European
human rights concerns. Those concerns are only going to become
stronger in the future, and only a practical solution will prevent opening
the door to SOFA modifications in this and possibly other areas. The
349. This, of course, assumes that the receiving state even will exercise jurisdiction.
Although the Netherlands initially prosecuted Short and sentenced him to six years imprisonment, its court of appeals reversed on the ground that it did not possess primary
jurisdiction. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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United States dual goals of maintaining a strong NATO alliance and
maintaining military discipline are served, not by clinging to a punishment option that has not been used in almost thirty years, but by recognizing the deep roots of the Netherlands position and by maximizing its
jurisdiction in spite of them. Before giving its assurances that the death
penalty either will not be given or will not be executed, the United States
certainly should argue its position strenuously. By thus registering its
objections, it preserves its view that even the request for these assurances
violates the SOFA. Before the United States thinks that the Netherlands
and like-minded receiving states will be persuaded by these arguments,

however, it must always remember Short.
The Cold War has ended, and many in the United States have attributed this to the enduring strength of principles of human rights and democracy. Throughout history, when those principles change, they presumably should only get better. Whatever the United States government
might officially say about cases like Short, it must recognize that Europe,
by abolishing capital punishment, has advanced that one-way ratchet of
human rights yet another notch. This Article merely recognizes that Europe probably will not retreat from its new position. With that in mind,
the United States only options are to stand firm or to compromise. Although by standing firm, the United States arguably is defending principles of international law, only by compromising will it achieve the goals
of unity and justice that NATO represents.

